Tbe ordinance affects three classes of persons: (1) residents; (2) nonresidents wbo conduct a business, practice a profession, or are employed in tbe city; (3) those wbo remain in tbe city for more than thirty days. Under tbe special verdict, tbe defendants are treated as falling within tbe second class; their homes are outside tbe corporate limits, but they are employees of a railroad company, whose shops are within tbe city, and they regularly drive their cars to and from the place in which they work. When arrested they were driving upon tbe streets of tbe city without a license.
Tbe defendants, as we understand, do not controvert tbe power or authority of tbe aldermen to enact a valid ordinance regulating tbe grant of a chauffeur’s license (Private Laws 1907, ch. 209, sec. 39 et seq.; Thompson v. Lumberton, 182 N. C., 260), but they rest their exceptions on tbe contention -that tbe ordinance in question is invalid as to all persons embraced in tbe second enumerated class.
They insist, first, that tbe ordinance is unreasonable, because, if a license may be required of them, it may be required of any person driving a car into tbe city for any cause or for any period of time; but this reasoning does not commend itself to our approval. It is obvious that tbe board of aldermen never contemplated tbe imposition of an examination for a driver’s license upon all wbo might enter or pass through tbe city; and it is equally obvious that tbe ordinance does not apply to cases of this kind.
They further contend that, as tbe special verdict does not fix tbe duration of their employment, they occupy tbe position of those wbo casually drive their cars into tbe city for a temporary purpose, and are therefore not within either of the specified classes; but tbe test of inclusion is not tbe duration of their employment, but their .presence as employees and tbe 'operation of their cars in the city. They go there by virtue of a contractual obligation to do certain work which requires their presence at tbe railroad shops within tbe corporate limits day after day for a period definite or indefinite. Driving their cars inside the corporate limits is an incident, perhaps an essential incident, of tbe business relation which they have voluntarily assumed; and if so, they may not successfully claim exemption from tbe inhibition of the ordinance *175merely on the ground that while their days are passed within, their nights are spent without, the corporate limits. In Whitfield v. Longest, 28 N. C., 268, Nash, J., said: “It is very certain that the legislative acts of the commissioners of a town are and must be limited to, and can have no effect beyond, the limits of the corporation; but the proposition is not true that none are bound by them but those who, in common parlance, are inhabitants of the town. All who bring themselves within the limits of the corporation are, while there, citizens, so as to be governed by its laws. If this were not so, those town laws or police regulations, so absolutely necessary and useful, would be entirely nugatory. No matter how important and necessary, whether to the health or peace of the town, or to the supply of its inhabitants with their daily provisions, they might be set at defiance, so far as the police of the town was concerned, by any individual who was not a corporator.” And in Wilmington v. Roby, 30 N. C., 250, Chief Justice Ruffin observed.: “It is settled that by coming within the town and acting there, a person becomes liable as an inhabitant and member of the corporation.” The defendants, by accepting employment in the city and doing their work there, bring themselves within the class described in the ordinance as “employed in said city.” Comrs. v. Capeheart, 71 N. C., 156.
The defendants say, in addition, that the ordinance is discriminatory and therefore unenforcible; but this position, we think, cannot be upheld. Of course, if a municipal ordinance appears upon its face to be discriminatory, or oppressive, or unreasonable, it will not be enforced; but ordinarily there is no discrimination where the impeached provision relates to all of a class. McQuillin states the rule in this language: “Laws relating to persons and things as a class, and not to persons or things of a class, are common, and usually sustained. The law will be held valid if it operates equally upon all subjects within the class for which the rule is applied. It thus follows that local police regulations are not to lie condemned because not specifically aimed at all persons in whatever business engaged, as they may have an express design of reaching certain classes in certain characters of work.” Municipal Ordinances, sec. 193 et seq. “The specific regulations for one kind of business, which may be necessary for the protection of the public, can never be the just ground of complaint, because like restrictions are not imposed upon other business of a different kind. The discriminations which are open to objection are those where persons engaged in the same business are subjected to different restrictions, or are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions. It is only then that the discrimination can be said to impair that equal right which all can claim in the enforcement of the laws.”—Mr. Justice Field, in Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S., 703; 28 Law Ed., 1145. *176See, also, Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U. S., 307, 319; 55 Law Ed., 229, 236; Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S., 171, 177; 59 Law Ed., 900, 903; Booth v. Indians, 237 U. S., 391, 395; 59 Law Ed., 1011, 1016. The principle has often been applied by this Court. Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N. C., 119; S. v. Powell, 100 N. C., 525; S. v. Moore, 104 N. C., 714; S. v. Pendergrass, 106 N. C., 664; Rosenbaum v. New Bern, 118 N. C., 83; S. v. Carter, 129 N. C., 560; Lacy v. Packing Co., 134 N. C., 567, affirmed in 200 U. S., 226; 50 Law Ed., 451; S. v. Danenberg, 151 N. C., 718; S. v. Lawing, 164 N. C., 492; Stone v. Texas Co., 180 N. C., 546; S. v. Vanhook, 182 N. C., 831.
It is contended tbat, owing to the provisions of the Public Laws of 1921, ch. 2, sec. 29, the ordinance is without legislative sanction. It will be noted, however, that the second proviso has reference to the privilege of operating a motor vehicle, while the third provides for regulating, licensing and controlling chauffeurs and drivers. We cannot concur with the defendant in construing the words, “any such car,” in the third proviso, as restricting the driver’s license to cars on which the privilege tax is laid. This construction would make the one tax entirely dependent upon the levy of the others. In our opinion, this was not the legislative intent. See Thompson v. Lumberton, supra, p. 265.
We find.
No error.