On 5 February, 1921, Garland Daniel was appointed receiver of the Southern Truck and Car Corporation, which for some time prior thereto had been engaged in manufacturing and selling automobile trucks. The receiver continued the business until 11 November, 1922, when, upon his discharge, the property was restored to the officers of the corporation. On 7 April, 1923, the plaintiff purchased all the property owned by the corporation, including several tracts or lots of land. Neither the corporation nor the receiver paid the license tax imposed under Schedule B of the Revenue Act for the fiscal years 1920-21 and 1921-22. Public Laws 1921, ch. 34, sec. 72.
Upon the plaintiff’s failure to pay the tax, the sheriff of Guilford County, at the instance of the State Treasurer, levied upon the land described in the complaint with a view to selling it, and the plaintiff obtained a restraining, order which was dissolved at the hearing. The plaintiff excepted and appealed.
*125The amount of the taxes and penalties is fixed by statute. Public Laws 1923, ch. 4, sec. 78, and ch. 12, secs. 109, 110; Public Laws 1921, ch. 34, sec. 72, and ch. 38, secs. 116, 117. So, likewise, is the lien on land. C. S., 7987 provides: “The lien of the State, county, and municipal taxes levied for any and all purposes in each year shall attack to all real estate of the taxpayer situated witbin the county or other municipality by which the tax list is placed in the sheriff’s bands, which lien shall attach on 1 June, annually, and shall continue until such taxes, with any penalty and costs which shall accrue thereon, shall be paid.” This section is a permanent statute in the sense that it is not 'altered or modified biennially in like manner with certain sections of the Eevenue Act. The several statutes relating to the subject should be construed together. By virtue of section 7987, the lien of the taxes for each year attached to the land on 1 June (Harper v. Battle, 180 N. C., 377), and in the absence of payment, has since continued. It is therefore immaterial that the plaintiff is a bona fide purchaser of the land for value and without actual notice. The plaintiff contends that the section applies only to such taxes as are collectible by the sheriff under the tax list delivered to him by the board of county commissioners; but the lien which attaches to land is that of State,' county, and municipal taxes levied for any purpose. The tax is levied or imposed for the privilege of carrying on the business or doing the act named, and is included in the clause, “taxes levied for any and all purposes.”
Tbe constitutionality of tbe section under which tbe tax was imposed is discussed in Bank v. Lacy, ante, 25.
Tbe judgment is
Affirmed.