The Revenue Act of 1923, ch. 4, sec. 79, imposes a license tax of $200 for each county for the procuring of laborers for employment out of the State, and makes it a misdemeanor for any person, firm, or corporation to engage in such business without having paid the tax and obtained a license as required by the statute. The power of the State Legislature to impose taxes of this character, and to select and classify the occupations and trades which shall be subjected to the same, has been fully sustained in the decisions on the subject. S. v. Lowe, ante, 524; Smith v. Wilkins, 161 N. C., 135; S. v. French, 109 N. C., 722. The defendant has been convicted and sentenced for violation of this statutory provision, and we find no reason for disturbing the result.
It is objected for defendant that his Honor, among other things, charged the jury as follows: “Now, the charge is that the defendant was engaged in the business of procuring laborers for employment out of North Carolina, and the court charges you that if he was here, procuring one, or two, or more men to go to work in another State, he would be guilty.”
If it be conceded that this excerpt, standing alone, might be the subject of criticism, on the record it may not be taken in that way, for the charge, in the very same paragraph, proceeds: “But before you can convict the defendant you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was engaged in the business of employing labor to go out of the State.”
In various decisions on the subject it is held that a charge shall be considered as a whole in the same connected way in which it was given, and on the presumption that the jury did not overlook any portion of it, and, when so taken, it “fairly and correctly presents the law, it will afford no ground for reversing the judgment, even if an isolated expression should be found technically inaccurate.” S. v. Dill, 184 N. C., at p. 650, citing S. v. Exum, 138 N. C., 599, and other cases.
In this and other portions of his Honor’s charge, and taking the same in an entirety, the jury were fully instructed that to constitute the offense the defendant must have been engaged in the business of pro*573curing laborers bere for employment beyond tbe limits of tbe State, and they could not bave been mistaken or misled by tbe excerpt objected to.
Defendant excepts further tbat bis Honor charged tbe jury tbat “tbe burden of showing a license was on tbe defendant.” This position, directly declared by tbe Court in S. v. Morrison, 14 N. C., 299, was reaffirmed in S. v. Emery, 98 N. C., 668, and has since been tbe unquestioned ruling with us in prosecutions of this character.
It was further and very earnestly contended for appellant tbat bis motion for nonsuit should bave been sustained for an entire lack of evidence tending to show tbat defendant was engaged in tbe business of procuring laborers for the purpose specified. It would serve no useful purpose to refer in detail to tbe features of the testimony as to this matter, and we consider it sufficient to say that we have carefully examined the record and are of opinion tbat there is ample evidence to permit tbe inference that defendant was engaged in tbe business of procuring labor for employment out of tbe State, and to uphold tbe conclusion reached by tbe jury.
There is nothing in tbe decision of S. v. Lowe, supra, tbat in any way conflicts with tbe disposition we make of tbe present appeal. In tbat case there was a special verdict, which established tbe fact tbat defendant was not engaged in tbe business of procuring labor, within the meaning of tbe statute, but was bere to get bands for tbe work in which be himself was engaged, and of which be bad charge. While bere tbe jury, under a charge free from error, has found tbat defendant was engaged in tbe business of procuring labor, etc.
There is no error, and tbe judgment below is affirmed.
No error.