The defendant disclaimed any responsibility of any kind, for Scott’s injury, and, therefore, denied any obligation for his treatment, except for first aid, which the defendant had paid. The defendant contends that no one was authorized to contract this bill on its behalf, and therefore denies liability for same.
At the close of the evidence of the plaintiffs, the defendant moved for nonsuit, and, on the denial of the motion, asked the court to charge the jury to answer the issue in favor of the defendant, contending the facts are undisputed, and insisted that the whole question was one of law. The defendant objected to all the testimony as not being made competent against it. The matters at issue, defendant contended, could be discussed under the broad questions as to whether there is any evidence in this case against the defendant, and whether a nonsuit should not have been granted at the close of the evidence.
The defendant further contends: There is no evidence of agency, other than the alleged declaration of the agent himself; that the agency cannot be proven by the declarations of the agent; that the defendant is not liable for medical treatment of an injured employee where it is not responsible for the injury, except for first aid in an immediate emergency.
"We do not think the entire evidence bears out the defendant’s contentions. The defendant introduced no evidence, and the plaintiffs’ evidence, on a motion for nonsuit, is taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. It does not appear from the record whether the defendant was liable for the injury to the young man, Scott, or not, but it does appear that he was in the employ of the defendant when injured, and, by inference, about his master’s business; that it was a terrible, serious and fatal injury. It appears that a local doctor was at once called to attend to Scott’s injuries, and that he was lying in a tent. The *555defendant paid tbis local doctor. Tbe local doctor, from the nature of the injury, found that it was necessary to send Scott to St. John’s .Sanatorium in Wilmington. This was done, and he was. taken there by two of the-employees of the defendant. He was sent there by Hogan, who told Dr. Hoggard, when Scott was in the sanatorium, that “Cornell-Young Company was back of it; that he was in their employ, and they wanted the best attention for him; that they treated their men that way.”
Now, the question, under the admitted evidence, is: Who was Hogan and what was his authority? He was superintendent of defendant’s construction works, engaged in building bridges. He had tents for defendant’s employees. He hired and discharged the employees. He purchased goods and materials, and the defendant sent checks from Macon, Ga., its headquarters, to pay for the purchase of goods and materials thus bought. He was recognized as having authority to buy materials. It was in evidence that Hogan not only superintended the construction and entire work, but often did special work for the company; that he worked on the boiler of the engine when it was broken down, etc. Defendant, by sending checks from its home office, acknowledged that he had authority to buy material for the work, and employ and discharge the workmen used in building the bridges. Mr. Young, of defendant company, stated that Hogan was in charge of the operation of the defendant company at that point. The question presented to us is: Did Hogan have authority to employ plaintiffs to administer to a human employed by him when broken and fatally wounded in the work of his master, the defendant company? If Hogan was superintendent of the construction and had entire charge, had authority to buy materials and repair and mend the broken machinery and employ and discharge the workmen, did he not have implied authority to authorize plaintiffs to care for and administer to the broken and fatally wounded employee, under the facts and circumstances of this case?
“And he said unto them, What man shall there be among you that shall have one sheep, and if it fall into a pit on the Sabbath day, will he not lay hold it and lift it out? How much, then, is a man better than a sheep?” St. Matthew, 12:11,12.
We think that Hogan had implied authority, under the facts and circumstances of this case, and acted within the scope of his employment in having plaintiffs care for and operate on the fatally wounded employee of defendant, and that plaintiffs were entitled to reasonable compensation for their services. We think there was sufficient evidence aliunde to make Hogan’s declarations competent.
In Hunsucker v. Corbitt, ante, 503, it was said: “Admissions by agents, made while doing acts within the scope of the agency, and *556relating to tlie business in band, are admissible against tbe principal wben sucb admissions may be deemed a part of tbe res gestee, but sucb admissions are not admissible to prove tbe agency; tbe agency must be shown aliunde before tbe agent’s admission will be received.” Lockbart’s Handbook on Evidence, sec. 154, citing numerous cases.
We do not tbink tbe case relied on by defendant (Adams v. R. R., 125 N. C., 565) in point. In that case tbe Court said: “There are some emergency instances in which the conductor may engage a physician to nurse tbe defendant’s servants or passengers wben injured, but, as to trespassers on tbe defendant’s road, no sucb authority is found to exist.” In that ease tbe party injured was a trespasser; in tbe present case, an employee.
That case recognizes tbe duty of a master, wben & servant is injured in bis employment, to engage a physician — in emergency instances. We tbink there could not be a stronger emergency instance than the instant one. Tbe local doctor thought so by sending tbe employee, with the authority of Hogan, tbe superintendent of defendant’s construction works, to plaintiffs’ sanatorium. Sanatorium v. Yadkin River Co., 167 N. C., 326.
We tbink tbe doctrine laid down in 14 A. — C. J., 434, correct in principle. It is said there: “A corporation is liable for hospital charges for tbe care of a person injured through instrumentalities used by it, where its officers and agents, with ostensible authority, direct tbe hospital authorities to take charge of sucb person and to continue tbe services, although no legal or moral obligation rests upon tbe corporation to care for him. An assistant to tbe general manager, with authority to look after tbe corporate interests in bis business, has ostensible authority, in tbe absence of tbe manager, to contract in an emergency for sucb hospital services.”
In Scott v. Monte Cristo Oil etc. Co., 15 Cal. App., p. 453, it is said: “Where tbe corporation defendant, though having a principal place of business at San Francisco, was engaged in developing its oil lands in Kern County, and bad placed its president in supreme local authority at its works, it is held that be bad presumed authority, where an employee was seriously injured thereat and became unconscious, to engage the services of a physician and surgeon, who found that be needed tbe operation of trephining, and to order him to be sent to a sanatorium for such operation, and to promise that tbe corporation would pay all bills therefor, and for nursing required thereat, and all bills required for bis care at sucb sanatorium.”
Tbe cases seem to be conflicting in different jurisdictions; but, after a thorough and careful consideration of tbe decisions, pro and con, we are led to tbe conclusion that, under tbe facts and circumstances in this *557case, it would have been an act of inhumanity, with the terrible injuries this young man had received in the employment of the defendant company, not to have sent him to the sanatorium for medical attention and treatment. We think the superintendent, Hogan, was in the scope of his authority and acted with good judgment and discretion. It was an emergency ease and a continuing one.
We can find
No error.