Upon a motion to nonsuit, the evidence is to be taken in a light most favorable to plaintiff. From a careful examination of the record we think that D. H. Tillett took the mortgage made to him in good faith and without notice, and the sale made by him under its terms was good and valid to pass the title in fee simple to the house *365and lot. We think the court below made no error in granting the non-suit. Hinton v. Hall, 166 N. C., 477; Brewington v. Hargrove, 178 N. C., 146; 27 Cyc., 1494.
The other assignments of error were exceptions to the testimony of 0. E. Thompson. He had purchased the land under the mortgage sale of J. C. Brooks and was sued by plaintiffs. A nonsuit was taken as to him and he was made a witness by plaintiff. He testified that he hid the property in for Catherine W. Brown at the request of 0. W. Brown. He made the deed to her and got the money from her to pay for the house and lot. In the direct examination he said: “I do not know that the money gotten from Mr. Tillett was paid over to me as the purchase-money. I know nothing of the Tillett loan of my own knowledge. The only information that I have as to that I got from C. W. Brown and afterwards from Mr. Tillett himself. Some time afterwards Mr. Tillett told me that he had loaned 0. W. and Catherine W. Brown $500 on the Harvey property.” On cross-examination he said: “I was present at the sale by Mr. Brooks. It was absolutely fair and open; several were bidding on the property. ... I knew nothing of any agreement or arrangement between C. W. Brown and Chas. Harvey and his wife. I did not know of any agreement that he should pay off the Brooks mortgage. There was nothing on record to call the matter to my attention, and I had no information from any one concerning it that there was any such agreement.”
On recross-examination Thompson testified:
“I did not tell Mr. Tillett about any agreement between Brown and Harvey, and no one else informed him in my presence. I did not tell Mr. Tillett nor did any one in my presence about any agreement between Brown and the Harveys, if there ever was any such agreement, whereby Brown was to pay off the Brooks mortgage. I did not know of the agreement myself until long after Mr. Tillett became interested in the property, nor did I know of the conveyance from Harvey to Brown until long after Mr. Tillett became interested. At the time of making the loan to Catherine W. Brown, Mr. Tillett told me about having made the loan at some time subsequent to that; he told me his first knowledge of the agreement which is on record was after the institution of this suit. It was evidently after the institution of the suit that he told me of the agreement on record, and he had told me of the loan to’ Catherine ~W. Brown at the time it was made or soon thereafter.'”
To this and similar evidence plaintiff excepted and assigned as error.
It will he noted on the direct examination that this matter was brought 'out by plaintiff. Thompson testified that the only information as to the Tillett loan was what he (Tillett) told him. Under the *366facts and circumstances in tbis case, on cross-examination, we think the evidence was competent. The plaintiff was trying to show that the Tillett loan was made with notice. The defendant was trying to show to the contrary. Tillett was a party defendant. We think the evidence goes as far as permissible to prove any circumstance calculated to throw light upon the intent of Tillett, and that he had no notice. It does not militate against the principle laid down in Durrence v. Northern Nat. Bank, 43 S. E., 726; 117 Ga., 385, where it is said:
“The only remaining ground of the motion for new trial complained that the court refused to permit Brewton to testify that H. J. Durrence bought the land In good faith and without notice of the deed from’ Brewer to Craig & Co. From the brief of evidence it appears that the witness was allowed to testify that, so far as the witness knew, Dur-rence had no notice of the title of Craig & Co. The ruling of the court, excluding the evidence above set out, was correct. While a vendee may testify that he bought without notice (Hale v. Robertson, 100 Ga., 168; 27 S. E., 937), no one else can do so, though such other witness may testify as to facts tending to show that the vendee had no notice, and especially that he had no notice from the witness. It is not competent for a witness to testify directly as to another’s intention. Cihak v. Klekr, 117 Ill., 643; 7 N. E., 111; Manufacturers Bank v. Koch, 105 N. Y., 630; 12 N. E., 9; 1 Jones Evid., sec. 167; Gardom v. Woodward (Kan.), 21 Am. St. Rep., 314, note (3. c., 25 Pac., 199). Brewton testified that, so far as he knew, Durrence bought without notice. To allow him to state, without qualification, that the vendee had no notice whatever from any source, would be to allow him to testify as to a matter which he could not possibly know to be true. So, while a vendee may be allowed to testify as to his own good faith, this is something which no one else can possibly know, and to which, therefore, no one else should be allowed to testify directly.” Wigmore on Evidence (2 ed.), sec. 661; Wolf v. Arthur, 112 N. C., 692; Stanley v. Lumber Co., 184 N. C., 306; S. v. Journegan, 185 N. C., 707.
We are of the opinion that there was no sufficient evidence to show that either Thompson or Tillett took with notice of the alleged agreement between plaintiffs and C. W. Brown. C. 0. Drew testified as follows as to this agreement: “They lived at this place before the death of Charles Harvey; I went to the place with C. W. Brown to see them before the deed was made. Charles Harvey was sick in bed.' I married the plaintiff’s daughter. I did not administer on his estate. I went out there with Brown to see them, and had a conversation, which was before the deed was made. Brown said he would give them fifty dollars and give them their life estate in the property, giving them a *367deed. Tbey told them they owed Mr. Brooks and were unable to pay him, and were hunting relief. He agreed to intervene and take up the mortgages.”
If there was an agreement between plaintiffs and 0. ~W. Brown that he would pay the Brooks mortgages and give them a life estate in the property, and in pursuance of this agreement the plaintiffs made a fee-simple deed to 0. W. Brown, and he in turn deeded a life estate to Chas. Harvey and wife, Susan Harvey, but in breach of his contract procured the Brooks mortgage to be foreclosed, Chas. Harvey having died, the life estate survived to his wife, Susan Harvey (Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N. C., 286), and she could recover damages for the breach of the contract. Parker v. Miller, 186 N. C., 501. For the reasons stated the judgment is
Affirmed.