Ledbetter v. Culberson, 184 N.C. 488 (1922)

Dec. 13, 1922 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

184 N.C. 488

MRS. SARAH C. LEDBETTER v. D. L. CULBERSON.

(Filed 13 December, 1922.)

1. Wills — Interpretation—Intent—Iweconcilable Provisions.

In construing a will, tlie intent of tlie testator, as embodied in tbe entire instrument, must prevail, and eacb and every part must be given effect if it can be done by fair and reasonable intendment; and where, under tbis rule, it appears tbat a later item of a devise or bequest therein is irreconcilable with a former one, tbe general rule is tbat tbe last expression will prevail.

2. Same — Title—Contracts to Convey — Deeds and Conveyances.

By tbe first item of tbe will a testator devised and bequeathed to bis wife “all of my property whatever and wherever found, . . . during ber natural Ufe only, tbe returns, income, and dividends accruing upon such stock as I may own at tbe time of my death” in a certain manufacturing concern; and provided in a later item tbat at tbe death of tbe wife tbe designated stocks and real estate not specifically including tbe locus in quo shall go to certain named collateral relations, with “remainder of my estate, both real and personal, not otherwise disposed of” to bis wife, tbe title to vest in ber absolutely and unconditionally at bis death. After tbe testator’s death tbe defendant contracted to purchase tbe locus in quo from tbe widow, and refused to accept ber deed, denying ber title under tbe will: Held, under a proper construction of tbe will, it was tbe intent of tbe testator tbat tbe fee-simple title to tbe lands in question should go to tbe widow under tbe later item of tbe will, which was reconcilable with tbe first thereof, and tbat tbe defendant comply with bis contract of purchase.

Appeal by defendant from Long, J., at November Term, 1922, of RICHMOND.

Civil action, beard on case agreed.

It appeared tbat plaintiff, tbe surviving widow and principal devisee under tbe will of ber husband, John L. Ledbetter, deceased, bas' contracted to sell to defendant a piece of ber land, claiming to own same under tbe provisions of said will. Defendant, admitting tbe contract and title of Jobn L. Ledbetter, as alleged, resists payment of tbe price agreed upon on tbe ground tbat tbe bargainor, under tbe terms of tbe will, did not bave a good title. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant excepted and appealed.

W. Steele Lowdermillc for plaintiff.

Bynum & Henry for defendant.

Hoee, J.

Tbe title offered is dependent, as stated, on a proper construction of tbe will of John S. Ledbetter and tbe provisions of'said will, and tbe facts more directly pertinent are stated in tbe “case agreed” as follows:

1. That John S. Ledbetter, at and before the time of Ms death, was a resident of EicMnond County, North Carolina, and that his wife was Sarah 0. Ledbetter, to whom he had been married for about 45 years.

2. That John S. Ledbetter died on or about 29 April, 1922, at the age of Y3 years, without children or lineal descendants, leaving a last will, an exact copy of which is as follows:

Last Will AND Testament of John S. Ledbettee, Deceased

2 October, 1919.

State of North Carolina and County of Richmond.

I, John S. Ledbetter, of the State and county above written, doth hereby will, give, devise, and bequeath and by these presents doth will, give, devise and bequeath all of my property whatever and wherever found to my beloved wife, Sarah 0. Ledbetter, during her natural life only, the returns, income and dividends accruing upon such stock as I may own at the time of my death in the Ledbetter Manufacturing Company.

The will then provides that on the death of his wife these stocks and certain specified real estate, not including the piece of land, the subject-matter of the contract, shall go to collateral relatives named, and closes with the following:

• “I give, devise, and bequeath unto my said beloved wife, Sarah 0. Ledbetter, to be hers and for own absolute and exclusive right, benefit and behoof forever, all the remainder of my estate, both real and personal, including money and choses in action, of which I may be seized and possessed. This item of my will bequeaths to my said wife all of my property of whatever kind and wheresoever located, not otherwise disposed of in this my will; and the title to all of same shall vest absolutely in my said wife unconditionally upon my death.

“I hereby constitute and appoint my said wife, Sarah C. Ledbetter, as the sole executrix of this my will, and I desire and direct that she not be required to make any monetary appraisement or returns of any sort or character to any court or courts of her actings and doings as such executrix, and she is specifically relieved from giving any bond for the performance of her duties as executrix of this will.”

. Upon these items of the will, defendant contends that as the first clause, gives all the testator’s property to his wife during her natural life only, this definite limitation is controlling, and that on the death of the wife the land not specifically devised will descend to the heirs at law of the testator, but the property in question, as stated, is not included in the specific or other devises to take effect at the death of the wife, and comes as clearly under tbe last clause of tbe will tbat makes her tbe absolute owner of “all tbe remainder of my estate” to be bers in absolute and exclusive ownership forever.

If tbe first and last items of tbis will are in irreconcilable conflict, tbe general rule is tbat tbe last shall prevail. Taylor v. Brown, 165 N. C., 157-163; Haywood v. Trust Co., 149 N. C., at p. 218; Baird v. Baird, 42 N. C., 266. But to our minds there is no such conflict presented. In Smith v. Lumber Co., 155 N. C., at p. 392, it is given as tbe accepted and well recognized position in tbe construction of wills: “Tbat tbe intent of tbe testator, as embodied in tbe entire instrument, must prevail, and each and every part must be given effect if it can be done by fair and reasonable intendment, before one clause shall be construed as irreconcilable with another, citing Holt v. Holt, 114 N. C., 241, and Davis v. Frazier, 150 N. C., 447.” A statement tbat is in very general accord with tbe authorities on tbe subject. Satterwaite v. Wilkerson, 173 N. C., 38; In re Knowles, 148 N. C., 465-468.

Applying tbis wholesome rule of interpretation, we think it clear tbat in tbis will tbe testator intended bis wife to have tbe ownership and control of all of bis property, including tbe income and accruing dividends on bis stock in the'Ledbetter Manufacturing Company, for her life. only. Tbe will then making disposition of bis stock and certain specified real estate, to take effect at her death, gave to tbe wife all tbe property tbat remained in absolute ownership forever.

Ve therefore affirm bis Honor’s decision tbat tbe title offered by tbe wife is a good one, and defendant must comply with bis contract.

Judgment affirmed.

Adams, J., not sitting-.