Tbe single exception is to tbe judgment permitting plaintiffs to amend and overruling tbe demurrer.
It was manifestly in furtherance of justice to permit plaintiffs to amend so as to show that plaintiffs, J. J. Redmon and W. H. Redmon, trading and doing business under tbe firm name of J. J. Redmon & Son, *483bad acquired tbe interest of plaintiffs, Bank of Yancey and Joe M. Burlinson, in tbe said $5,000 policy. Tbis amendment eliminated all question as to misjoinder either of parties or actions, since from tbe very nature of tbe case J. C. Eedmon, trustee, and W. H. and J. J. Eedmon bave tbe sole interest in tbe result of tbe action as to botb of said policies.
Tbe court, at any time ’before or after final judgment, can permit an amendment in furtherance of justice. C. S., 547. But irrespective of said amendment, there has been neither a misjoinder of parties or causes of action.
Tbe Code of Civil Procedure provides that those united in interest must be joined as plaintiffs. It also provides that causes of action may be joined when they arise out of tbe same transaction, or transactions connected'with tbe same subject of action. Plaintiffs are all parties united in interest, and tbe causes of action arise out of tbe same transaction, and a transaction connected with tbe subject of tbe action. Quarry Co. v. Construction Co., 151 N. C., 349.
In Pretzfelder v. Ins. Co., 116 N. C., 495, tbe plaintiff’s stock of merchandise was insured in several different fire insurance companies, each of which companies, under tbe terms of tbe respective policies, was to pay its proportionate share of any loss occasioned by fire. Subsequently tbe goods were damaged by fire and tbe plaintiffs brought a single action on all of said policies, joining all of said fire insurance companies as defendants. Tbe Court held that “there was not only no misjoinder of parties, but that tbe joinder was essentially proper.”
In tbe Pretzf elder case, supra, tbe Court said that if separate suits bad been brought, then tbe same propositions of law and tbe same evidence would bave been to go over in five different actions, and at an expense of five times tbe court costs, and a needless waste of tbe Court’s time, and with tbe prospect of five different juries assessing tbe loss at five different amounts.
The same and stronger reasons exist for joinder of parties and causes of action in tbis case. Botb policies are issued by tbe same company, and to J. J. Eedmon and W. H. Eedmon. Tbe same fire-occasioned tbe loss under each policy. Tbe same lumber is insured under each policy. Joe M. Burlinson, as debtor of J. J. Eedmon and W. H. Eedmon, to the extent of $20,000, and as owner of tbe excess of said lumber above .the amount necessary to discharge said indebtedness, and not destroyed by fire, was interested, in tbe result of’ each of said causes of action, tbe amount of lumber left to him after tbe extinguishment of bis said debts depends upon tbe amount of money recovered in said causes of action. Joe M. Burlinson was also united in interest with other plaintiffs as *484payee under said $5,000 policy. J. C. Redmon, as trustee, was interested in the recovery under both, causes of action, in the $20,000 policy by express designation as the payee, and in the second or $5,000 policy according to his rights, and his only rights being that of trustee to sell said lumber and pay off said $20,000 debt. The Bank of Yancey was interested in the result of each of said causes of action in that it was entitled to hold the interest of Joe M. Burlinson in the $5,000 policy to secure its said debt of $1,700.
The above would be valid reasons for the joinder had not J. J. Red-mon and ~W. H. Redmon, trading and doing business under the firm name of J. J. Redmon & Son, acquired the interest of the Bank of Yancey and of Joe M. Burlinson in said $5,000 policy, but with said interests so acquired there can be no misjoinder of parties nor of causes of action.
Affirmed.