Tbe indictment charged the larceny of one diamond of the value of $700, the property of M. P. Orr. The evidence for the State, if believed, is conclusive that Kate Hauser was guilty of larceny of the diamond, which was a large diamond set in the center of a brooch, surrounded by pearls and small diamonds. She stole the brooch and it was later recovered in the same form as stolen. There was no separation of the diamond from the brooch. The defendant’s counsel contends, however, that larceny of a diamond being charged in the bill and the proof being that it was s.et in the brooch, was a fatal variance. If the defendant stole the diamond it makes no difference whether it was attached to the brooch or in a bag or box or lying about loose. S. v. Harris, 64 N. C., 128, in which the charge was for larceny of “50 pounds of flour,” and the proof showed theft of a sack of flour. This was approved in S. v. Nipper, 95 N. C., 655, and in S. v. Kiger, 115 N. C., 750. In this last case the charge was theft of so many gallons of brandy and the proof was of so many barrels of brandy, which was held sufficient.
The defendant further takes the objection that the indictment charged that the diamond was the property of M. P. Orr, and that it appeared in the evidence that it was the property of his wife; but the two were living together as husband and wife, and he had charge of her affairs and of the property in the house, and therefore had possession with her of her legal effects. He therefore had possession, which was equivalent to a special property therein, notwithstanding that the Constitution recognizes the wife’s rights in her individual property. S. v. Wincroft, 76 N. C., 38; S. v. Matthews, ibid., 41; Bishop New Criminal Procedure, p. 1687.
The other defendant, Curtis Gentry, besides raising the two questions which are above raised on behalf of Kate Hauser, insisted there was no evidence in the case that he receivd the diamond knowing it to be stolen; but there was evidence, if believed, from which it appears clearly that *771Kate Hauser carried tbe broocb to Curtis Gentry’s bouse. Sbe was a colored nurse, and tbe testimony is tbat tbe broocb was worth about $600. He sold it for $50. Tbe testimony is tbat sbe' spent tbe nigbt at bis bouse and tbe next morning tbe broocb was missing. Kate Hauser testified tbat be stole it from ber. Tbe conflict in tbe evidence on tbis point is not material, for wbetber be received it to sell for ber, knowing it to bave been stolen, or stole it from Kate Hauser, be evidently knew tbat sbe bad obtained tbe broocb unlawfully, and it could be charged either as ber property or as 'the property of tbe true owner. Wharton, sec. 1825; Ward v. People, 3 Hill, 396, both cited in S. v. Wincroft, 76 N. C., 40. Being tbe same article, tbe larceny or receiving was against tbe rights of tbe owner, and could be charged as parts of tbe same illegal asportation in tbe same bill.
There are some other exceptions, but we do not think tbat they present questions tbat require discussion. We bave, however, fully Examined them, and after bearing tbe learned argument of tbe counsel, we find
No error.