after stating the pertinent facts: We will repeat here what we said in Bank v. McArthur, 168 N. C., 48 at page 52: “We are of the opinion that the remark of the learned and unusually careful judge, in regard to calling a certain witness, should not have been made, and was calculated, as an intimation, if not a direct expression, of *89■opinion upon tbe facts, to prejudice tbe plaintiff, and is forbidden by tbe statute, wbicb provides: No judge, in giving a charge to a petit jury, either in a civil or criminal action, shall give an opinion as to whether a fact is fully or sufficiently proven, such matter being the true office and province of the jury; but he shall state in a plain and ■correct manner the evidence given in the case and declare and explain the law arising thereon. There have been numerous decisions upon this -statute, and this Court has shown a fixed purpose to enforce it rigidly as it is written. There must be no indication of the judge’s opinion upon the facts, to the hurt of either party, either directly or indirectly, by words or conduct. The judges should be punctilious to avoid it, and to •obey the. statutory injunction strictly. We are absolutely sure that they fully desire to do so, and their occasional expressions which have come before this Court for review and held to be violations of the statute Lave evidently been inadvertent, but none the less harmful. The evil impression when once made upon the jury becomes well-nigh ineradicable.” Manly, J., who was one of the most eminent and just of our .judges, said in S. v. Dick, 60 N. C., 440: “He (the presiding judge) ■endeavored to obviate the effect of his opinion by announcing in distinct terms the jury’s independence of him; but this was not practicable for Lim to do. The opinion had been expressed and was incapable of being recalled. The object (of the statute) is not to inform the jury of their province, but to guard them against any invasion of it. ' The division ■of our courts of record into two parts — the one for the judging of the law, the other for the judging, of the facts — is a matter lying on the surface of our judicature, and is known to everybody. It was not information on this subject the Legislature intended to furnish, but their purpose was to lay down an inflexible rule of practice, that the judge of the law should not undertake to decide the facts. If he cannot do so directly, he cannot indirectly; if not explicitly, he cannot by inuendo. What we take to be the inadvertence of the judge, therefore, was not ■cured of its illicit character by the information which he immediately •conveyed. The error is one of the casualties which may happen to the most circumspect in the progress of a trial on the circuit. When once ■committed, however, it was irrevocable, and the prisoner was entitled to have his case tried by another jury.” And to the same effect did Soke, J., speak in S. v. Cook, 162 N. C., 586, citing and approving S. v. Dick: “The learned and usually careful judge was evidently conscious that he had probably and by inadvertence prejudiced the prisoner’s case, for he added: ‘But the court has no right to express an opinion about the ■case,’ but the forbidden impression had already been made, and as to the vital portion of the prisoner’s plea, and on authority, the attempted *90correction by bis Honor must be beld inefficient for tbe purpose.” So in S. v. Ownby, 146 N. C., 678, we said: “Tbe slightest intimation from a judge as to tbe strength of tbe evidence or as to tbe credibility of a witness will always bave great weight with tbe jury, and therefore we must be careful to see that neither party is unduly prejudiced by an expression from tbe bench which is likely to prevent a fair and impartial trial.” And again in tbe same case: “We know that bis Honor un-guardedly commented upon tbe testiimony of tbe witnesses, but when tbe prejudicial remark is made inadvertently, it invalidates tbe verdict as much so as if used intentionally. Tbe probable effect or influence upon tbe jury, and not tbe motive of tbe judge, determines whether tbe party whose right to a fair trial has thus been impaired is entitled to another trial.” Like views and cautionary requests to tbe judges were stated in Withers v. Lane, 144 N. C., 184, as follows: “Tbe learned and able judge who presided at tbe trial, inspired, no doubt, by a laudable motive and a profound sense of justice, was perhaps too zealous that what be conceived to be right should prevail; but just here tbe law, conscious of tbe frailty of human nature at its best, both on tbe 'bench and in the jury box, intervenes and imposes its restraint upon tbe judge, enjoining strictly that be shall not in any manner sway tbe jury by imparting to them tbe slightest knowledge of bis opinion of tbe case.” Tbe case of Perry v. Perry, 144 N. C., 330, repeats this injunction to observe tbe mandate of tbe statute, for it is there said: “Any remarks by tbe presiding judge, made in tbe presence of tbe jury, which bave a tendency to prejudice their minds against tbe unsuccessful party, will affofd ground for a reversal of tbe judgment.” It is very strongly and urgently reiterated in Park v. Exum, 156 N. C., 228, as follows: “Tbe Court has always been swift to enforce obedience to our law which forbids a presiding judge to express an opinion on tbe disputed facts of tbe trial, and under numerous decisions construing tbe statute, we must bold this remark of his Honor, in tbe presence of tbe jury and before the verdict, to be reversible error.” We bave cited these cases in order to show how very carefully this Court has guarded tbe rights of parties under tbe statute (Revisal of 1905, sec. 535;' O. S., sec. 564). There are other and more recent cases in which reflections by tbe presiding judge upon a witness bave been followed by reversals and the attention of tbe judges directed to the language and meaning of this important statute, and .among others are Chance v. Ice Co., 166 N. C., 495; S. v. Rogers, 173 N. C., 755; Ray v. Patterson, 165 N. C., 512, and in some of those decisions tbe disparagement of tbe witness was not so pronounced, and certainly less harmful, than was tbe language of tbe judge in this case.
It was considered so essential to protect the right of trial by jury that *91tbe statute was broadly worded and was among tbe earliest of our remedial enactments, and, while it refers in terms to tbe charge, it has always been construed as including tbe expression of any opinion, or even an intimation of tbe judge, at any time during tbe trial, calculated to prejudice either of tbe parties. Park v. Exum, 156 N. C., 228; Withers v. Lane, 144 N. C., 184; S. v. Dick, 60 N. C., 440; Pell’s Revisal, sec. 535.
Tbe learned and just judge attempted to correct tbe error into which be fell by tbe remarks be made and tbe criticism of Mr. Hoag, and bis conduct as an attorney acting in behalf of bis client, but there, is nothing better settled by our cases than that be cannot do so, for tbe barm is ineradicable. S. v. Dick, supra; S. v. Cook, supra. When tbe damage is once done it cannot be repaired because, as we know, tbe baneful impression on tbe minds of tbe jury remains there still. What a judge says in condemnation of a witness is generally fatal to tbe party in whose behalf be testifies. Tbe witness stands before tbe jury not only impeached, but thoroughly discredited. What tbe judge says in disparagement of him counts for far more than witnesses or counsel may utter against him. It would be dangerous to bold otherwise. There are other cases than S. v. Dick, supra, and S. v. Cook, supra, in which this Court has held that tbe impeachment of a witness, emanating from tbe judge, becomes so deep-seated in tbe minds of tbe jury as to be beyond tbe reach of tbe judge, however much be may endeavor to counteract its evil influence, and it will, at least, leave tbe |>arty once prejudiced by it so completely handicapped as to prevent that fair and impartial trial which tbe law guarantees to him and to which be is justly entitled. One word of untimely rebuke of bis witness may so cripple a party and blast bis prospects in tbe case as to leave him utterly helpless before tbe jury.
■ It must not be understood that we think that tbe judge was at all ' sensible, at tbe time, of tbe effect of bis remarks upon tbe jury, for we know that be was not, and that they were made inadvertently and unconsciously. Tbe case then is brought directly within tbe language of ‘this Court quoted from Withers v. Lane, supra. For tbe judge, even to intimate that tbe conduct of tbe witness, an attorney, was unprofessional and . unethical was undoubtedly calculated to prejudice tbe defendant, whatever in tbe way of explanation or atonement of it be may have said . afterwards, and however praiseworthy tbe motive or intention of tbe judge may have been. The enforcement of a moral principle, when time and occasion call for it, is highly commendable, but tbe statute does not permit it to be done from tbe bench when tbe rights of one of tbe parties may be seriously impaired, if not destroyed, by it. We close this branch of tbe discussion with what was said by tbe Court in Chance v. Ice Co., *92166 N. C., 495, at page 497: “We are quite sure that it was not intended to prejudice the defendant’s case by the able and painstaking judge who tried this case, but it undoubtedly was well calculated to prejudice the jury against that particular witness, and was practically an expression of opinion upon the part of the judge as to the credibility of such witness.” To the same effect is the language of the Chief Justice in Ray v. Patterson, 165 N. C., 512.
As the case must go back for another trial, it is not necessary to discuss the other questions raised. We may, however, say that there appears to be some evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, and the references to the insurance company, in one phase of the case, were relevant, though they may, in some respects, have gone too far.
We order a new trial for the error of the judge in his remarks to Mr. Hoag, defendant’s witness.
New trial.