When the case was called for argument the defendant’s counsel filed a motion for a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence. The motion must be denied. In numerous decisions this Court has held that a new trial will not be awarded in a criminal action for newly discovered evidence; and in S. v. Lilliston, 141 N. C., 857, the Chief Justice said: “So the point is settled, if the uniform practice of this Court and its repeated and uniform decisions to the same effect can settle anything.” S. v. Register, 133 N. C., 747; S. v. Turner, 143 N. C., 641; S. v. Ice Co., 166 N. C., 403.
The defendant in apt time made a motion to dismiss the action as in cáse of nonsuit. C. S., 4643. Eecapitulation of the testimony would serve no useful purpose, for it is plain that the controversy could be determined only by the verdict of the jury. At the trial there was evidence tending to show that on the night of 5 March, some one had broken into the prosecutor’s smokehouse and had stolen six hams and six shoulders, which, on 7 March, were found in possession of the defendant; also evidence of various other circumstances tending to connect the defendant with the offense charged. The defendant testified, and introduced several witnesses in his behalf. An issue of fact was thus joined between the State and the defendant, and the court properly submitted to the jury the question of the defendant’s guilt. In S. v. Carlson, 171 N. C., 823, it is said: “The motion to nonsuit requires that we should ascertain merely whether there is evidence to sustain the allegations in the indictment. The same rule applies as in civil cases, and the evidence must receive the most favorable construction in favor of the State for the purpose of determining its legal sufficiency to convict, leaving its weight to be passed upon by the jury.”
There is an exception to the charge. The record contains this statement: “The court further charged the jury that one found in posses-*820sioiL of stolen property recently after tbe commission of tbe tbeft is presumed to be tbe thief, but that tbis is a presumption of fact and not of law, and is weak or strong according to tbe facts and .circumstances of tbe case; that one found in possession of goods recently stolen was called upon to account for or explain bis possession by tbe evidence in tbe case and circumstances, but that tbis presumption arising from tbe possession of goods recently stolen could be rebutted and explained, and tbe burden was on tbe defendant to show to tbe satisfaction of tbe jury, if they found from tbe evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that tbe defendant was in tbe possession of tbe stolen meat, bow be came into its possession ; but be would not bave to show it beyond a reasonable doubt nor by a preponderance of evidence, but merely to tbe satisfaction of tbe jury; and if tbe evidence in tbe case in explanation of sucb possession, or any evidence or circumstances, raised a reasonable doubt in tbe minds of tbe jury as to tbe guilt of tbe defendant tbat tbey would return a verdict of not guilty; and tbe court further charged tbe jury tbat before tbey could consider any presumption arising from what it called recent possession tbe jury would bave to be satisfied from tbe evidence beyond a reasonable doubt tbat tbe meat found in tbe smokehouse of tbe defendant was tbe meat in question of tbe prosecuting witness, and tbat it bad been stolen.
“Tbe court further charged tbe jury tbat tbe defendant was presumed to be innocent, and tbat tbis presumption of innocence continued throughout tbe entire case, and tbat before tbey could convict tbe defendant tbey must.be satisfied from tbe evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt, and tbat if tbey were so satisfied tbey would find him guilty, but if tbey were not so satisfied tbey should return a verdict of not guilty.”
Tbe court instructed tbe jury in effect tbat tbe prosecution was begun with a presumption of innocence in favor of tbe defendant, and throughout tbe trial tbe burden remained with tbe State to satisfy tbe jury beyond a reasonable doubt tbat tbe defendant was guilty of tbe offense charged in tbe indictment. Tbat portion of tbe charge which imposed upon tbe defendant tbe burden of explaining possession of tbe stolen property to tbe satisfaction of tbe jury, considered alone, was technically incorrect. If, after tbey bad considered all tbe evidence, tbe jury entertained a reasonable doubt of bis guilt, tbe defendant was entitled to an acquittal; and such reasonable.doubt may bave existed although tbe jury may not bave been satisfied with tbe defendant’s particular explanation. However, by considering tbe charge in its entirety, “in tbe connected way in which it was given” (S. v. Exum, 138 N. C., 599), we observe tbat bis Honor, after saying tbat tbe burden was on tbe State to satisfy tbe jury beyond a reasonable doubt of tbe defendant’s guilt, gave tbe additional instruction tbat if tbe evidence in explanation of tbe defendant’s *821possession o£ tbe property, or any evidence or circumstances, raised a reasonable doubt as to tbe guilt of tbe defendant, tbe verdict should be not guilty. Upon consideration of tbe record we find no reversible error.
No error.