after stating the case: There was ample evidence to support the conviction of the defendant, who reserved several exceptions to the rulings of the court upon the evidence.
The first four exceptions were directed to sales made to other persons than A. T. Cooper, the person named in the first count of the indictment, as the particular one to whom the sale was made. This testimony was competent and relevant as applicable to the second count, which charges the keeping of liquor for sale. The allegation therein could hardly be proven in any other way. Sales indiscriminately to any and every person who would buy is evidence, of course, of keeping liquor for sale. The defendant was thereby doing just what any man who is engaged in the forbidden act of keeping liquor for sale would do. He was the proprietor of a “grog shop,” one of the great evils intended to be prohibited by the statute as demoralizing to the community and the prolific source of crimes and many other evils.
The testimony offered by defendant, and the subject of his exceptions numbers five and six, were clearly irrelevant. The verdict of the jury could have no possible relation to the credibility of the witness, but *817if so, tbe defendant got tbe benefit of it, as tbe witness testified that tbe verdict was contrary to his testimony in tbe case.
Exceptions, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 were to statements by witnesses of prior declarations of another witness while on tbe stand, which were corroborative of .that witness, and was so restricted by tbe court, or concerning sales of liquor to one Godwin, and this evidence was confined in its application to tbe second count as to keeping liquor for sale. It was manifestly competent, and very relevant for that purpose.
Tbe exception No. 20 is entirely untenable. Irvin Simmons, a witness for tbe defendant, bad testified substantially in contradiction of tbe State’s witness, A. T. Cooper, as to tbe purchase of liquor by him from tbe defendant, and tbe latter attempted to support him by proving bis good character, but this be failed in law to do, as tbe witness H. M. McKetban, whom be offered for this purpose, did not know Simmons’ general reputation, and bis Honor correctly held that be bad not, therefore, been qualified to testify about it. S. v. Perkins, 66 N. C., 126; S. v. Gee, 92 N. C., 756.
It can make no difference whether tbe defendant sold tbe liquor directly to Cooper, or indirectly through an agent, or “go-between.” Tbe one act is just as bad as tbe other morally and legally. It comes most certainly within tbe prohibition of tbe statute. When Cooper stated, “I bad another man to go and get it,” be was testifying apparently to a fact within bis own knowledge — a thing done by himself, and it was competent for him to do so. It was just as illegal for tbe defendant to sell to tbe witness’s agent for him as to sell directly to tbe witness. S. v. Burchfield, 149 N. C., 537. But tbe specified ground of objection, upon bis motion to strike out tbe answer above quoted, was that testimony of other sales of liquor by defendant was incompetent, but this, as we have said, is not tbe law so far as tbe second count of tbe indictment is concerned. It is contended by tbe defendant that this was evidence of a distinct substantive offense, and be cites S. v. Shuford, 69 N. C., 486, as an authority directly in point, but it does not apply, as tbe evidence was not offered on tbe first count, for tbe sale, but on tbe second count, charging that be kept liquor for sale, and as to that count it was competent and admissible. An appellant is confined to tbe ground of objection to evidence which be first stated. He must abide in tbe Court of appeal by tbe ground of objection which was assigned below at tbe trial and not shift bis ground, or change bis theory of tbe ease. Bank v. Pack, 178 N. C., 388, and cases cited at p. 390. This point of law decided in that case is not stated in tbe official beadnote.
Tbe testimony of Lacy Godwin was competent beyond any question. He was testifying that bis father bad sent him to defendant to buy liquor *818for bim, and that be went and actually bought tbe liquor for bis father. One of bis answers was: “I went for tbe liquor twice at my father’s request. I never bought it for myself, but for my father.” He then stated, “It worked out that I paid him for it, and I did give bim money — five dollars — and I got a quart of whiskey.” Learned counsel for tbe defendant contended in bis brief that this testimony was prejudicial, and it was, but, nevertheless, was competent.
This is a case where tbe statute was iialpably violated, in any view of tbe facts, and notwithstanding tbe very able and ingenious argument of tbe defendant’s counsel, Mr. Davis, we are compelled to declare that no error was committed at tbe trial.
No error.