The first five exceptions must be overruled. John H. Dalton, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that he had surveyed all the lines of the grant under which the plaintiffs claimed title, except the last three; that he had prepared the plat; that the last three lines followed the courses and distances called for; and that the red lines represented the land embraced in the grant issued to the plaintiffs. The witness was *730then permitted to testify, over the defendants’ objection, that the line from E to F “will run north of some cut timber.” A. T. Siler, a witness for plaintiffs, testified that he surveyed the boundaries of the plaintiffs’ grant in 1893 and in 1894; that he had a record of his surveys, showing that his plat corresponded with Dalton’s; that he could indicate on Dalton’s map the survey he had made; and that he had found an oak at one of the corners. To all this evidence the defendants excepted.
The former witness described the lines he had actually surveyed and the others, which he said indicated the last three calls in the grant, and testified in effect that if these lines represented the true location of the grant, timber had been cut inside the boundaries; and the examination of the latter witness was so carefully limited by the court that it could have been understood only as illustrating the testimony of the witness as to the surveys he had previously made.
The plaintiffs called as a witness Julius McCoy, one of the defendants, to prove the alleged trespass. On cross-examination counsel for the defendants asked the witness if he knew the location of the grant under which the defendants claimed title. The grant had not then been offered in evidence, and the answer was properly excluded. His Honor, however, explicitly stated that the witness might be examined as to the location, in case the grant should afterwards be introduced by the defendants.
The excluded evidence, which is the subject of the ninth exception, was afterwards admitted; and exceptions eight, ten, eleven, twelve, and seventeen were relevant only to the controversy between the interpleaders and the defendants, and upon return of the verdict for the plaintiffs became immaterial.
His Honor instructed the jury that unless the defendants and the interpleaders had shown by the greater weight of the evidence that the lines of the plaintiffs’ grant lapped upon the grant under which the defendants claimed, the possession of the defendants or interpleaders, or of those under whom they claimed, outside the boundaries of the plaintiffs’ grant would not be extended so as to defeat or affect the title of the plaintiffs. The instruction must be considered as a part of the entire charge, and in connection with the admissions in the pleadings. His Honor had previously told the jury that upon the plaintiffs rested the burden of establishing their title by the greater weight of the evidence. In their answer the defendants did not expressly deny the plaintiffs’ title, but only denied that the plaintiffs were the owners of such part of grant No. 16,105 as may lap upon grant No. 2,924. It will be observed that the defendants attempted to defeat the plaintiffs’ recovery by showing an interference of the two grants. Under these circumstances the charge of his Honor as to the burden of proof and as to possession under grant No. 2,924 is free from error; and the instruction as *731to tbe measure of damages is a substantial compliance witb tbe rule stated in Whitfield v. Lumber Co., 152 N. C., 214.
Tbe remaining exceptions have received full consideration, and must be disallowed. . Tbe controversy between tbe parties was reduced almost entirely to questions of fact pertaining to tbe location of tbe grant under wbicb tbe defendants claimed, and tbe jury adopted tbe contentions of tbe plaintiff. ¥e find in tbe record no sufficient cause for disturbing tbe verdict or tbe judgment.
No error.