The defendants rely chiefly upon their motion for judgment as of nonsuit; but, under the principle announced in Steeley v. Lumber Co., 165 N. C., 27; Pigford v. R. R., 160 N. C., 93, and numerous other cases to like import, we think the evidence was sufficient to require its submission to the jury and to warrant a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
The remaining exception is directed to a portion of his Honor’s charge in which he undertakes to state the plaintiff’s contentions. Defendants say the contentions of their adversary were overstated, or stated too strongly; that they were not supported by the evidence, and that they were given in an argumentative form. We have examined the charge with a view of determining whether the defendants could have been prejudiced in any degree by the manner in which the contentions were given, but we have found nothing upon which to base any criticism. On the other hand, the charge as a whole seems to have been fair, impartial, and exceptionally clear. Furthermore, this exception comes within the well settled rule that objections to the statement of contentions must be made at some appropriate time during the charge or at its conclusion. This requirement is a reasonable one, and has been adopted so that the trial court may be given an opportunity to correct any error in the respect indicated. S. v. Hall, 181 N. C., 527; McMahan v. Spruce Co., 180 N. C., 636, and cases there cited.
We have discovered no sufficient reason for disturbing the verdict and judgment.
No error.