In section 1389, C. S., ch. 26, it is provided that the board of county commissioners of Tyrrell and certain other counties therein specified may abolish the office of county treasurer by resolution to that effect, passed at least sixty days before a primary or convention held for the purpose of nominating candidates for said office, and when so abolished the board of commissioners may appoint one or more solvent banks or trust companies to perform the duties of treasurer, or sheriff acting as ex officio treasurer of the county, such designated depositaries not being allowed to charge or receive anything in compensation other than the advantages accruing to them from such a deposit. And said banks and trust companies, termed financial agents, are also required to give bond for safe keeping and proper disbursement of said funds, and for faithful performance of their duties concerning them. Acting under this statute the commissioners of Tyrrell County, by formal resolution passed in apt time, have abolished the office of county treasurer and designated the banks to act as financial agents of the county, who have *68duly accepted and qualified, and if these proceedings are valid, we find no good reason for disturbing the judgment of bis Honor, as it appears of record.
The only objection against the propriety of this judgment urged before us on the oral argument and the original brief filed in behalf of the appellant is that the office of treasurer being one provided for in the Constitution, may not be abolished except by direct legislative action, and the attempt to vest such power in the board of commissioners of any county may not be upheld. It is true that Article YII of the Constitution, sec. 1, provides in terms that for the ordinary purposes of general county government there shall be elected biennially a treasurer, register of deeds, and five commissioners, but it is also provided in the same article, section 14, that as to this and all other sections of the article, except sections 7, 9, and 13, neither of which have any bearing on the question presented here, the General Assembly shall have full power by statute to modify, change, or abrogate any and all the provisions of this article and substitute others in their place. In reference to the power conferred in section 14, it has been frequently held, and is now the accepted construction, that in order to its exercise it is not required that an act to effect a change in municipal government should be “general in its operation or that it should in terms formally abrogate any given section of this article and substitute another in its stead, but that an act of the General Assembly making such change, and local in its operation, must be given effect under this provision if otherwise valid.” Smith v. School Trustees, 141 N. C., 157, citing Harris v. Wright, 121 N. C., 179.
This being the established position, the Legislature, under approved principles, in our opinion had the undorrbted right to confer the exercise of the power referred to in section 14 upon the board of county commissioners of Tyrrell County, and said board, proceeding properly under the act, having formally abolished said office, the judgment of his Honor must be upheld.
"While legislative power granted by the Constitution may not as a rule be delegated, it is fully recognized that under our system of government such power may be delegated to municipal corporations for local purposes where as agencies of the State they are possessed and in the exercise of governmental powers in designated portions of the State’s territory, whether such localities are the ordinary political subdivisions of the State, or local governmental districts created for special and public quasi-purposes. Trustees v. Webb, 155 N. C., 379; Smith v. School Trustees, 141 N. C., 143-149; S. v. Austin, 114 N. C., 855; People of N. Y. in re Dunn v. Ham, 166 N. Y., 477; S. and Josephine Tantor v. *69 Mayor, etc., 33 N. J. L., 57; 1st Smith Modern Law of Municipal Corporations; 1st Cooley on Taxation (3 ed.), 101; Black’s Constitutional Law (3 ed.), 373.
In the citation to Cooley the principle is stated as follows: “There is, nevertheless, one clearly defined exception to the rule that the legislature shall not delegate any portion of its authority. The exception, however, is strictly in harmony with the general features of our political system, and it rests upon an implication of popular assent which is conclusive. This exception relates to the case of municipal corporations. Immemorial custom, which tacitly or expressly has been incorporated in the several state constitutions, has made these organizations a necessary part of the general machinery of state government, and they are allowed large authority in matters of local government, and to a considerable extent are permitted to make the local laws.”
And in Black, 374, the author says: “Municipal corporations are regarded as subordinate agencies of government created with a view to the more judicious and effective administration of local governmental affairs. The Legislature has power to create such corporations and to invest them with such powers and prerogatives as are necessary to enable them to make rules for the government of their own affairs, particularly in matters of taxation and police, provided that their by-laws and ordinances shall not be inconsistent with the general laws of the State.”
The case before us comes clearly within the principle, and the commissioners of Tyrrell County were well within their powers in the abolition of the office. And the defendant, admitting that he received the public funds of the county while he was the treasurer, and insisting on the right to hold and disburse them under a claim that the office has not been abolished and that he has them as of official right, the authorities are to the effect that mandamus is the appropriate procedure. O’Donnell v. Dusman, 39 N. J. L., 677; S. ex rel Meinger, Collector, v. Disbrow, late Collector, 42 N. J. L., 141; S. v. Oates, 86 Wis., 634; 26 Cyc., 258, and authorities cited in note 40; 18 R. C. L., title, Mandamus, secs. 120 and 186. And it appearing from a perusal of the record that this is an action to enforce the turning over the public funds of Tyrrell County pursuant to the requirement of the statutes directly applicable, C. S., ch. 56, sec. 1400; ch. 62, secs. 3205 and 3206, and ch. 82, sec. 4385, the case presented is not in strictness a suit on a moneyed demand, coming under C. S., 867, and which requires that the summons be returnable to term, and to be proceeded with as in ordinary civil actions wherein the material issues must be determined by jury unless formally waived, but it comes under the subsequent section, O. S., 868, which provides that the summons may be returnable before the judge in chambers or in *70term, and be shall determine all issues of law and fact, unless a jury trial is demanded by one or both of the parties. Coleman v. Coleman, 148 N. C., 299; Audit Co. v. McKenzie, 147 N. C., 461; Martin v. Clark, 135 N. C., 178.
In the present case no demand was made for a jury trial by any of the parties, no exception was entered because same was not allowed, nor by exception or otherwise was any objection made to the mode of trial in the oral argument before us nor in any brief as then filed. In a brief filed by one of defendants some fifteen days later, and by consent, objection is made that there are disputed questions of fact presented in the affidavits and evidence, but these are only as to differences arising at the hearing, and no demand is therein shown or claimed that any jury trial was claimed on any material issues arising on the pleadings.
There is no error, and this will be certified that the funds of county, admitted to be in the hands of defendant Holloway, shall be forthwith delivered to the financial agents of the county, and that the amounts in dispute be so delivered when and determined in accordance with law and the course and practice of the court, and the restraining order in the meantime be continued as directed in the judgment.
No error.