The Juvenile Court Act (C. S., 5039 et seq.) jirovides that the Superior Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of any *47case of a child less than sixteen years of age “whose custody is subject to controversy.” By this same law juvenile courts are established as separate parts of the Superior Courts for the administration of the •act, and the clerk of the Superior Court of éach county is made the judge of the Juvenile Court.
It is also provided in a later section that the term “Court,” when used without modification, shall refer to the Juvenile Court, and that an appeal may be taken from any judgment or order of the Juvenile Court to the Superior Court.
It thus appears that the act confers jurisdiction upon the Superior ■Courts, and that the Juvenile Courts, as separate parts (but not necessarily as independent parts) of the Superior Courts of the district, have been created and organized for the administration of the law and for the hearing of matters and causes arising thereunder. S. v. Coble, 181 N. C., 554.
Again, in S. v. Burnett, 179 N. C., 740, it was held that the act “creates no limitations on the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts in these cases which, under the first sections of the act and by virtue of its powers, as a court of general jurisdiction administering both law and equity, may always, on proper application and appropriate writ, make inquiry and investigations into the status and conditions of children disposed of under the statute, and make such orders and decrees therein as the right and justice of the case may require.” This supervision and oversight of the Superior Courts, of course, should be exercised in an orderly way by appeal from the Juvenile Court, where such is provided by the statute, and otherwise by appropriate writ, where no appeal is available.
Assuming this to be the proper interpretation of the law, we'need not consider the regularity of the order transferring or sending the petition to the Juvenile Court for original investigation. This could have no effect upon the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, nor would it make any material difference, for when the matter again reached the judge of the Superior Court he had ample authority to hear the case, either because it was properly instituted in the first instance, or by virtue of the appeal from the Juvenile Court. Therefore, viewing it in any light, the case was competently before the Superior Court in the last instance for final adjudication.
His Honor also had authority to review the findings of fact and judgment of the clerk, which were under the supervision and control of the Superior Court. Mills v. McDaniel, 161 N. C., 112.
The findings of fact made by the judge of the Superior Court, found as they are upon competent evidence, are also conclusive on us (Stokes v. *48 Cogdell, 153 N. C., 181), and we must therefore base our judgment upon Ms findings, wMeh amply sustain Ms order.
We recognize fully the principle that prima facie the parent bas tbe right to the custody of his child in preference to others, but that this right is not an absolute one and must yield when the best interest of the child requires it (In re Warren, 178 N. C., 43), and his Honor has found as a fact that the petitioner “is not a fit, suitable or proper person to have the care and custody of this infant girl, and that the best interest and welfare of the child will be subserved by leaving her in the custody and care of the respondents.” He also finds that the child is afflicted in.an unusual way by spinal trouble, requiring the treatment of a specialist, and that the respondents are ready, able and willing to-provide this treatment for the child, and have frequently offered and endeavored to do so, and that the petitioner had practically abandoned his family prior to the death of his wife.
Upon the record the judgment of the Superior Court must be sustained.