It is conceded at the outset that the board of education and the commissioners of Davidson County have not proceeded under C. S., 5511, for the establishment of a central high school, or high schools in a township, as provided by said section. It should also be noted that the resolution of the board of education, purporting to create the Lexington High School District, and the two special acts of the Legislature relating thereto, were all passed prior to the enactment, on 8 March, 1921, of ch. 119, Public Laws 1921, amending the public school law of the State. Hence, the validity of the resolution and the special acts in question must he determined by the law as it existed at the time of their passage — there being no suggestion of a ratification by any subsequent legislation.
The sections of the school law chiefly relevant and bearing upon the questions now before us are:
0. S., 5469, which provides: “The county board of education shall, divide the townships, or the entire county or any part of the county into convenient school districts, as compact in form as practicable. It shall consult the convenience and necessities of each race in settling the boundaries of the school district for each race.”
And 0. S., 5473, which is in terms as follows: “The county board of education is hereby authorized and empowered to redistrict the entire county or any part thereof and to consolidate school districts wherever and whenever in its judgment the redistricting or the consolidation of districts will better serve the educational interests of the township, or the county, or any part of the county.”
It will be observed that these statutes, which were passed in obedience to Article IX, section 3, of the Constitution, confer upon the several county boards of education authority (1) to divide the townships, or the entire county, or any part thereof, into convenient school districts (not to exceed the limit fixed by 0. S., 5472); and (2) to redistrict the entire. *433county, or any part thereof, and to consolidate school districts whenever and wherever such, in their judgment, will better serve the educational interest of the townships or of the county.
This grant of power from the Legislature, we apprehend, refers to the establishment, consolidation, etc., of districts in the sense of territorial divisions or geographical regions (Howell v. Howell, 151 N. C., 575; 18 c. J., 1292), and not in the sense of dividing or segregating pupils as distinguished from the land on which they live. “In its ordinary meaning the word district is commonly and properly used to designate any one of the various divisions or subdivisions into which the State is divided for political or other purposes, and may refer either to a congressional, judicial, senatorial, representative, school, or road district, depending always upon the connection in which it is used.” Oliver v. State, 11 Neb., 1, 13; 7 N. W., 444.
Giving to the words of the statute their usual and customary meaning, we have found no authority for the establishment by the county board of education of such a district as the “Lexington High School District (No. 7, agreed facts), which, to be more exact, might properly be termed a superdistrict in that it is sought to be created by superimposing the same upon the eight districts comprised therein. An arrangement of this kind may be very desirable and helpful in the building up of an educational system for the State; but, as now advised, we do not think the Legislature had so declared its purpose and policy at the time of the attempted establishment of the district in question. Nor do we wish to be understood, by what is said here, as suggesting that probably such a district might be created under ch. 179, Public Laws 1921: This latter question is not before us, and any expression presently made would be obiter and we make none.
Holding, as we do, that the resolution of the board of education of Davidson County, passed on 16 February, 1921, was insufficient to accomplish the desired purpose, and that the establishment of the proposed district was therefore-ineffectual, it follows that the special acts of the Legislature, incorporating and authorizing said district to issue bonds, must be declared inoperative. Ex nihilo nihil fit.
There being no valid district in existence, the Legislature now is without authority itself to pass any local, private, or special act establishing or changing the lines of school districts. Const., Art. II, sec. 29; Sechrist v. Comrs., 181 N. C., 511; Trustees v. Trust Co., 181 N. C., 306.
The judgment of his Honor permanently enjoining and perpetually restraining the defendant from issuing the'bonds in question must be upheld upon the facts now appéaring on the instant record.
Affirmed.