From the evidence, the charge, and the plaintiff’s prayers for instructions, as well as his exceptions, it appears that the theory upon which the case was tried is that of accord and satisfaction. This doctrine is recognized as a method of discharging a contract, or settling a cause of action arising either from a contract or a tort, by substituting for such contract or cause of action an agreement for the satisfaction thereof, and an execution of such substituted agreement. 1 R. C. L., p. 177. C. S., 895, provides: “In all claims, or money demands, of whatever kind and howsoever due, where an agreement is made and accepted for a less amount than that demanded or claimed to be due, in satisfaction thereof, the payment of the less amount according to such agreement in compromise of the whole is a full and complete discharge of the same.”
The defendant testified, it is true, that the plaintiff was satisfied with the settlement, and that there was no dispute, but in addition the de*329fendant said in substance tbat after considering tbe claims of eacb party be finally agreed to make payment in settlement of all matters; and it is somewhat difficult to conform all tbe evidence to tbe conclusion tbat tbe settlement was not in tbe nature of an accord and satisfaction. We are, therefore, unable to see Row tbe plaintiff could have been prejudiced by tbe court’s embodying in one issue tbe substance of tbe three issues tendered by tbe plaintiff. It is obvious tbat tbe question whether tbe defendant gave, and tbe plaintiff accepted, tbe checks in part payment or in full settlement could easily have been presented under tbe issue submitted. In fact, this seems to have been one of tbe controverted questions, for tbe plaintiff distinctly testified tbat tbe checks were not accepted in final settlement, and tbat be thereafter made demand on tbe defendant for tbe remainder claimed to be due. If tbe issues are directed to tbe material facts arising upon tbe pleadings and afford an opportunity of presenting tbe various phases of the controversy, their number is a matter within tbe discretion of tbe court. Millikin v. Sessoms, 173 N. C., 723, Drennan v. Wilkes, 119 N. C., 512; Dalrymple v. Cole, 181 N. C., 285.
Only a few of tbe exceptions to tbe admission and rejection of evidence require discussion. Tbe plaintiff contends tbat tbe court erroneously excluded evidence offered by him for tbe purpose of showing in connection with tbe receipt and tbe first check what bad and what bad not been sold, and for tbe purpose of showing in connection with tbe second check tbat tbe words “in full settlement” did not include all matters in controversy. We recognize tbe principle which, under certain circumstances, permits tbe introduction of parol evidence for tbe purpose referred to, as, for instance, in Long v. Guaranty Co., 118 N. C., 507; but we are of opinion tbat tbe principle is not applicable to tbe plaintiff’s exceptions. Tbe plaintiff accepted and collected both tbe checks, and signed and delivered tbe receipt. There is no allegation in tbe pleadings that tbe plaintiff was induced by fraud, imposition, or mistake, to accept tbe checks or to sign tbe receipt, and be is therefore bound by their terms. In view of tbe limitation in tbe first check of “payment in full to date,” and in tbe receipt of “full settlement of all accounts and for all crops sold up to date,” it is not unreasonable to assume tbat tbe plaintiff accepted tbe second check “in full settlement” of all matters in controversy (Kerr v. Sanders, 122 N. C., 638), and hence, “will not be permitted to collect tbe check and repudiate tbe condition.” Aydlett v. Brown, 153 N. C., 336; Cline v. Rudisill, 126 N. C., 524; Ore Co. v. Powers, 130 N. C., 153; Mercer v. Lamber Co., 173 N. C., 54.
We have-carefully examined all tbe prayers for instructions, and find them untenable. Tbe granting of some would have required tbe judge *330to invade the province of the jury, and the granting of others would have withdrawn the issue or directed an answer.
In his Honor’s instructions to the jury we find no reversible error. Several of the exceptions relate to statements as to the contentions of the parties, and the court was not advised at the time of the plaintiff’s objection. S. v. Foster, 172 N. C., 960; McMillan v. R. R., ib., 853; S. v. Little, 174 N. C., 801.
We are precluded from giving to a part of Mr. Bailey’s interesting argument the consideration which ordinarily it would merit for the reason that it was based upon a theory distinct from and inconsistent with that upon which the case was tried before the jury. There is a uniform line of decisions which hold that after a party has elected to try his case on one theory in the lower court he may not be permitted to change his attitude with respect thereto on appeal. Brown v. Chemical Co., 165 N. C., 424; Lindsey v. Mitchell, 174 N. C., 459; Barcliff v. R. R., 176 N. C., 41; King v. R. R., ib., 306; Lipsitz v. Smith, 178 N. C., 100; Hill v. R. R., ib., 612; Starr v. O'Quinn, 180 N. C., 94. All the plaintiff’s exceptions are disallowed.
No error.