The issues submitted to the jury are raised by the pleadings, and are substantially like those approved in Pritchard v. Williams, 176 N. C., 110, and as there was evidence supporting the contention of the plaintiff that he made valuable improvements on the land, believing in good faith that he would own it in fee upon the death of his mother, under a deed executed by her, the court could not direct a verdict in favor of the defendants.
The fact that there was an outstanding life estate in the plaintiff or in his mother is not a bar to the claim for betterments, since the plaintiff claimed under a deed and believed he owned the fee.
“It is the general rule that a life tenant is not entitled to compensation from the remainderman for the enhancement of the property by reason of his improvements, nor can a charge upon the lands or the inheritance-be made for such improvements, it being generally held that a life tenant should not be permitted to consume the interest of the remainderman by making improvements that the remainderman cannot pay for, or that he does not desire, and also that improvements are made for the immediate benefit of the life estate, and usually without reference to the-wishes of the remainderman. Mere knowledge on the part of the remainderman that improvements are being made, and passive acqui*78escence therein are not sufficient to charge him with the cost thereof. An exception has been made where the life tenant is an infant, and the income from the property is by order of the court invested in permanent improvements. Ordinarily, a third person claiming under the life tenant is entitled to no greater rights than the life tenant himself, but .some courts, applying equitable principles, have allowed recovery where improvements have been made by a person who, although in fact holding-under a life tenant, believed himself to-be the owner of the fee.” 17 R. C. L., 635.
Our Court has adopted the view allowing betterments to one holding under a life tenant when made under the honest, well-grounded belief that he owns the fee. Pritchard v. Williams, supra, and the same case at this term.
The cases upon the right of a life tenant to compensation for improvements are collected in the note to Porter v. Osmun, 3 Anno. Cases, 689.
This disposes of the first, second, third, fourth, and 5th assignments of error, the sixth, seventh, and eighth are formal, and the ninth, tenth, .and eleventh present the question of the right of defendants to set off against the improvements the rents and profits of the land during the occupancy by the plaintiff.
The usual rule is undoubtedly that one 'claiming betterments is chargeable with the rents, even beyond the three years, as an offset against a recovery for the improvements (Con. Stat., sec. 700; Whitfield v. Boyd, 158 N. C., 453), but this is because generally the owner of the land at the time of its recovery also owns the rents, and the law gives to each what belongs to him. , It awards to the owner the land and his rents, and to the occupant the value of his improvements, but in this case the -owners were not entitled to the rents during the occupancy by the plaintiff, because of the life estate in his mother or in the son, one of whom was the owner of the rents, and consequently there can be no abatement of the recovery for the improvements in favor of the defendants on account of the rents, to which they have no claim or right.
It is upon this principle that the rights of the parties were adjusted in Pritchard v. Williams, which is also reported in 175 N. C., 319, and 178 N. C., 444.
No error.