Todd, witness for the State, testified that on 7 November, 1920, be purchased one pint of liquor from the defendant for $6 at bis restaurant in Asheville, and that at other times since 1913 he had purchased drinks from him. He testified also that the defendant kept the liquor in a five or ten gallon can and in a coffee pot. Jarrell, another witness for the State, testified that he had purchased the liquor which was exhibited in evidence for the witness Todd, who gave him $6 which he paid for it. Shaw, another witness, testified that he was present when the liquor was handed to the witness Jarrell. Here the State rested, and the defendant moved for judgment of nonsuit, which *589was denied, tbe court remarking to tbe counsel tbat be would bave to charge tbe jury if tbey believed tbe evidence to find tbe defendant guilty, to wbicb tbe defendant excepted. There was no error in this statement upon tbe evidence then before tbe court. Tbe defendant then testified in bis own behalf tbat be did not sell any liquor to Todd, and tbat be never-bad any liquor for sale in a coffee pot or in a five or ten gallon can.
There was evidence from some of tbe defendant’s witnesses tbat be was a man of good character, and others gave him not so good a character. Tbe defendant excepted because tbe court' refused to permit two of tbe defendant’s witnesses to answer tbe question, “Do you know defendant’s character for truth and veracity?” These two exceptions were abandoned, not being brought forward in defendant’s brief. Rule 34 of this Court (174 N. C., 837), provides: “Exceptions in tbe record not set out in appellant’s brief, or in support of wbicb no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned by him.” Tbe exception, however, could not bave been sustained, if insisted on, for tbe rule is well settled tbat tbe party introducing a witness as to character, “can only interrogate him as to tbe general character of such person”; S. v. Hairston, 121 N. C., 582, citing S. v. Daniel, 87 N. C., 507; S. v. Laxton, 76 N. C., 216. Tbe counsel, in making these exceptions, was probably misled by what was said in S. v. Foster, 130 N. C., 675, tbat “when tbe defendant has gone upon tbe stand in bis own behalf it is competent to prove bis general character for truth,” but tbe context shows tbat this arose upon evidence for tbe State to impeach bis character as is shown by tbe citation of S. v. Traylor, 121 N. C., 674.
Exception 5 was simply a statement by tbe judge of a contention by tbe State; besides, tbe defendant did not object to tbe admission of tbe evidence upon wbicb tbe contention was based.
Exception 6 was because tbe court charged tbe jury: “If tbe State has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt tbat at tbe time named, tbe defendant in this ease delivered to tbe witness, James Todd, a pint of spirituous liquors, and tbat tbe witness paid him therefor tbe sum of $6, then tbe court charges you tbat tbe defendant is guilty of selling spiritous liquors, and it is your duty to return a verdict of guilty.”
Tbe seventh exception is to tbe following charge: “If, from all tbe evidence, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt tbat tbe defendant kept spiritous liquors on band for tbe purpose of sale, then it is your duty to return a verdict of guilty.”
In these particulars we find no error. Tbe other exceptions are formal, to tbe denial of a motion for a new trial; and to tbe judgment.
No error.