Tbe feme plaintiff was a passenger on tbe train of tbe defendant railroad company, 19 August, 1919, traveling from Wilmington, N. C., to Bolton, N. C. Sbe was very old and feeble and so informed tbe conductor, requesting bim, at tbe time, to assist ber in alighting from tbe train and to bave a box for the purpose, which was not done. A boy who was standing near tbe train when it stopped at tbe station offered to go for a box, which was near by, but tbe conductor refused to let bim do so, and threatened to “carry ber on if sbe could not get off,” and was rude and rough to ber, using insulting language. Sbe sat on tbe floor of tbe platform and slid or bumped down tbe steps after tbe conductor bad said, “Are you coming off or not?” to which sbe replied, “Well, if I bave to get off without any help and expose myself and hurt myself I will bave to do so.” Sbe added, “He could not bave talked meaner to me.” Sbe further testified that it was too far from tbe ground for ber to step from tbe car, and sbe was severely injured in attempting to do so; that sbe bad been ruptured and “ber ruptures were torn loose”; that sbe nearly fainted and bad to lie down for ten days and suffered great pain. The jury returned a verdict for tbe plaintiff, assessing tbe compensatory damages at $400 and tbe punitive damages at $100. Judgment thereon, and tbe defendant appealed. Tbe two instructions requested by tbe defendant were sufficiently covered by tbe charge. Tbe real question was whether tbe jury believed tbe plaintiff or tbe conductor, and they believed tbe former. It was tbe duty of tbe defendant’s conductor to render ber such assistance for alighting from tbe car as was reasonably necessary in ber weak physical condition. Sbe was very old and bad been ruptured. Tbe conductor was notified that sbe needed help; be was put on bis guard, but says be forgot it. Tbe plaintiff was entitled to proper assistance as she was aged and feeble or infirm, which, if not apparent to tbe conductor, was made known to bim by tbe son of tbe plaintiff, and by ber before sbe alighted. Morarity v. Durham Traction Co., 154 N. C., 586; Moore on Carriers, 682; Hinshaw v. R. R., 118 N. C., 1052-1055; R. R. v. Miller, 23 Am. St. Rep., 308. This controversy would not bave arisen if conductors would always treat their passengers with proper consideration. Courtesy and politeness are cheap commodities, costing little in tbe beginning but paying well in tbe end, while rudeness never pays and often proves to be very expensive. It is tbe conductor’s duty to see that bis employer does not suffer by bis omission of duty, and especially by bis lack of civility and proper attention to those who, because of apparent or known feebleness, cannot help themselves or alight safely from tbe cars. Lanier v. Pullman Co., 180 N. C., 406. Tbe verdict may not be supported by tbe facts, but we must assume that it is as there is nothing to authorize us to impeach it, and we bave proceeded *499on the hypothesis of its correctness in what we have said. There was evidence here that step-boxes were seen on the train and the use of one of them would have saved the company a vast deal of trouble and annoyance, not to speak of the money loss.
The ruling of the judge as to punitive damages was 'correct in every particular. There was evidence tending to show inexcusable conduct on the part of the conductor and such treatment of this old and feeble woman as justified the imposition of punitive damages, which may be allowed when there is an element of fraud, malice, such a degree of negligence as indicates reckless indifference to consequences, oppression, insult, rudeness, mere caprice, willfulness or some other element of aggravation in the act or omission causing the injury. Holmes v. R. R. 94 N. C., 318-323; Thompson on Carriers of Passengers, 157; 3 Southerland on Damages, 270; Ammons v. R. R., 140 N. C., 198 (S. c., 138 N. C., 559; Wilson v. R. R., 142 N. C., 340; Stanford v. Grocery Co., 143 N. C., 427; Stewart v. Lumber Co., 146 N. C., 47; Hansley v. R. R., 115 N. C., 607; Lanier v. Pullman Co., 180 N. C., 406. The other exceptions are without substantial merit.
The objection to evidence is general, whereas some of it at least is competent. The exception, therefore, cannot be sustained. The objection should, in such a case, be specific and designate that part of the evidence supposed to be incompetent. S. v. Ledford, 133 N. C., 714; Kennedy v. Trust Co., 180 N. C., 225-229; Lanier v. Pullman Co., 180 N. C., 406.
The charge of the court submitted the case to the jury pointedly and fully, and properly refused a nonsuit and the peremptory instruction requested by the defendant. The verdict, as we have said, may be wrong, but we have to accept it as right, unless there was some error in law for which it should be set aside, and we have found none which justifies a reversal.
No error.