There was sharp controversy between tbe parties as to tbe value of tbe estate in question, but that was a matter for tbe jury, which was properly submitted to them. We cannot agree that, though there was a difference in tbe value, tbe price given for tbe property was *464so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of men and induce them to exclaim, “Why he got it for nothing.” His Honor submitted the question of inadequacy of the price to the jury correctly, and gave to the plaintiffs the benefit of every principle of law to which they were entitled. This price was no more grossly inadequate than was that in Carman v. Page, 59 N. C., 37. And, besides, the jury may have found that there was no such discrepancy between price and value, as claimed by the plaintiff, and it is likely they did so, and they may also have found that plaintiffs had all the knowledge they needed, as to the value of the lands, for their own protection and for their dealing with the defendants “at arms length.” Knight v. Bridge Co., 172 N. C., 393, is not applicable to the extent contended by the plaintiffs’ counsel. But the consideration here, as we have said, is not even gross, and that of itself is sufficient to distinguish the two cases.
Taking up the special prayers for instructions, we may say that a careful reading and analysis of the charge convinces us that his Honor fully responded to these instructions, and, at least, it was substantially done. The slight changes were immaterial, and in no degree weakened the force of the prayers. "When speaking of the presumption of fraud arising from the fiduciary relation and inadequacy of price, the judge stated that in such a case the law raised a presumption of fraud in procuring the deed, and then added, “and will set it aside.” We cannot possibly see how this prejudiced the plaintiffs. It rather was in their favor, as showing with what disfavor the law regarded such a transaction.
As to the other amendment to the prayers, it certainly cannot be contended, with any hope of success, that a man need be told what he already knows. The law only requires that he have full knowledge of the material facts, and if he has this, it can plainly make no difference how he acquires it. But the fiduciary must be sure that he has it, in one way or another.
Under the evidence and charge, the jury have evidently found that plaintiffs had such knowledge, and that the transaction between them and the defendants was in every way fair and aboveboard, that the consideration was adequate and that no advantage was taken by the defendants. This satisfies the rule. McLeod v. Bullard, 84 N. C., 516; Cole v. Boyd, 175 N. C., at p. 558. The consideration being fair, and there being no oppression, the jury have expressly found that the sale was free from fraud. Nothing, therefore, can impair the validity of this sale.
There is one more question: Counsel for plaintiffs attempted to read a portion of this Court’s opinion in Bell v. Harrison, 179 N. C., 190, when, at the instance, of the defendants’ counsel, he was stopped by the court, which was evidently of the opinion that the portion read by plain*465tiffs’ Counsel might prejudice defendants upon the findings of fact, and would not be confined strictly to the law. The two cases grew out of tbe same administration, and there was grave danger of prejudicing the defendants upon the facts, if counsel was allowed to read the part of the opinion and case proposed to be read by him. There was not the least restriction of his right to argue the law to the jury, and to use the opinion in doing so, and we think his Honor properly exercised his discretion in preventing injustice to the defendants, without curtailing counsel’s privilege under the statute to argue the law. Besides, the judge charged the law fully and correctly to the jury in accordance with that case, and if any technical error was committed it worked no harm.
The private examination of the married woman was properly taken. While the husband was in the room when it was taken, this did not invalidate it, as it appears that he was so far away that his presence in the room did not prevent her from expressing her will and desire in the matter to the clerk without the slightest restraint, but with perfect freedom. Hall v. Castlebury, 101 N. C., 153, fully sustains the probate of the deed.
The case was correctly and impartially tried, and plaintiffs have no sufficient ground of complaint.
No error.
Stacy, J., dissenting.