Tbe two policies in suit were issued under authority of chapter 109, Public Laws 1915. Each, contained, among other provisions; tbe following stipulation which was expressly prescribed and sanctioned by tbe statute law of tbe State then in force:
“No suit or action on this policy, for tbe recovery of any claim, shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless tbe insured shall have complied with all tbe requirements of this policy, nor unless commenced within twelve months next after tbe fire.”
Tbe loss occurred on 1 June, 1918, and suit was commenced 25 October, 1919, nearly seventeen months thereafter.. This was not in keeping with tbe terms of tbe policies as above set out. These contractual limitations and other substantially similar provisions have been upheld in a number of decisions. Holly v. Assur. Co., 170 N. C., 4; Muse v. Assur. Co., 108 N. C., 240; Lowe v. Accident Assn., 115 N. C., 18; Hovey v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 200 Fed., 925; Modlin v. Ins. Co., 151 N. C., 35; Gerringer v. Ins. Co., 133 N. C., 414; Parker v. Ins. Co., 143. N. C., 339; Faulk v. Fraternal Mystic Circle, 171 N. C., 302.
*435In explanation of the delay in commencing snit within the time fixed by the policies, plaintiffs contend that they were induced to defer action on account of the defendant’s conduct in agreeing to an appraisal and award of damages, etc., but we are unable to find in the record any waiver or action not contemplated by the terms of the contracts of insurance. Hayes v. Ins. Co., 132 N. C., 702.
As now presented, and upon the record, we think the judgment of nonsuit should be sustained.
Affirmed.