Dye v. Morrison, 181 N.C. 309 (1921)

May 4, 1921 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

181 N.C. 309

L. E. DYE v. ROBERT MORRISON and Wife.

(Filed 4 May, 1921.)

1. Deeds and Conveyances — Registration—Leases—Notice.

The owner of the fee by a registered chain of title is not affected with notice of a ninety-nine-year lease under which an adverse party claims from a common source until the registration of the lease, no other notice being sufficient under the provisions of our statute, C. S., 3309.

2. Same — Possession of Lessee.

The mere possession of the locus in quo under an unregistered ninety-nine-year lease is not sufficient notice to the owner of the fee under a valid paper chain of title. C. S., 3309.

3. Same — Limitation of Actions.

The statute of limitations does not begin to run in favor of the lessee in possession under a ninety-nine-year lease of lands until the registration of the lease, as against the owner of the fee under a paper chain of title from a common source. C. S., 3309.

Appeal by defendants from McElroy, J., at December Term, 1920, of RICHMOND. •

Civil action of. ejectment, commenced in July, 1920. Upon trial in the Superior Court the defendants formally made the following admissions:

That the plaintiff is the owner of the fee in the lands described in the complaint and now in the possession of the defendants; that Henry P. Gill was a common grantor; that the said Henry P. Gill, on 29 May, 1896, conveyed the said lands to D. M. Morrison, which deed was duly registered in the office of the Register of Deeds for Richmond County on 8 June, 1896, Book HHH, p. 153, and that said deed is in all respects regular; that plaintiff holds said lands by mesne conveyances from the said D. M. Morrison, all of which are properly executed and registered; that the defendants claim right to possession of a portion of said lands described in tbe complaint under and by virtue o£ a ninety-nine-year lease from Henry P. Gill, wliicb said lease was duly registered in tbe office of tbe Register of Deeds for Ricbmond County on 4 March, 1912, in Book 68, p. 582, said lease being as follows:

7 April, 1896.

State oe Nokti-i CakoliNA — RichmoND OouNty.

Know all men by these presents, I, Henry P. Gill, have leased a piece or parcel of land for ninety-nine years, commencing at a stake at tbe Nebor Road, running down tbe said spring branch to tbe said railroad ; down tbe said railroad to tbe disputed line, called tbe Andrew J. Rogers line, and up tbe said line to tbe Nebor Road, up tbe said Nebor Road to tbe beginning corner. Tbe said above lease to Anny J. Morrison. I herein set my band and seal.

(Signed) HeNky P. Gill.

I witness tbe within writing on tbe other side of tbe paper.

'William M. (bis X mark) JoNes.

That tbe defendants, upon execution of tbe said lease, entered into possession of tbe same until tbe institution of this action, but tbe plaintiff and those under whom be claims title, other than said Henry P. Gill and D. M. Morrison, bad no actual knowledge of tbe existence of said lease prior to its registration in 1912.

Tbe only defense set up in tbe answer is a plea of tbe ten-year statute of limitations. Upon tbe pleadings and admissions, bis Honor instructed tbe jury that if they believed tbe evidence they should answer tbe issues in favor of tbe plaintiff. Defendants excepted and appealed.

Ozmer L. Henry and W. B. Jones for plaintiff.

Gibbons & LeGrand for defendants.

Stacy, J.

It is admitted that tbe plaintiff is tbe owner in fee of tbe locus in quo, and that be bolds tbe same under mesne conveyances from Henry P. Gill, who conveyed said lands in 1896 to D. M. Morrison, plaintiff’s predecessor in title, by deed regular in all respects and duly registered in tbe office of tbe Register of Deeds for Richmond County on 8 June, 1896. Tbe defendants claim right of iiossession to a portion of tbe lands described in tbe complaint by reason of a ninety-nine-year lease executed by tbe said Henry P. Gill to Anny J. Morrison on 7 April, 1896, and under which defendants took possession, but said lease was not registered until 4 March, 1912.

Tbe plaintiff’s deed, from tbe common source of title, having been registered prior to tbe lease of tbe defendants, gives him tbe superior legal claim under our registration laws. Mintz v. Russ, 161 N. C., 538; Combes v. Adams, 150 N. C., 64. And it bas been beld witb us repeatedly that no notice, however full and formal as to the existence of a prior conveyance, will of itself supply the place of registration. Fertilizer Co. v. Lane, 173 N. C., 184; Allen v. R. R., 171 N. C., 339; Lynch v. Johnson, 170 N. C., 110. Our statute, C. S., 3309, establishes priority of right from registration within the county where the land is situated. Weston v. Lumber Co., 160 N. C., 263; Quinerly v. Quinerly, 114 N. C., 145.

Nor do we think the possession of defendants alone can be said to be notice of any adverse claim. Lanier v. Lbr. Co., 177 N. C., 200. In Sexton v. Elizabeth City, 169 N. C., 385, the rule is stated as follows: “The policy of our law now is that purchasers for value should be protected as against unregistered conveyances of the same property from the vendor, as nothing but registration shall be considered notice to them of any prior deed for the land, it having grown into an axiom that No notice, however full and formal, will supply the place of registration’ ”; citing Piano Co. v. Spruill, 150 N. C., 168, and Todd v. Outlaw, 79 N. C., 235.

From the foregoing, and considering all the facts and circumstances in the instant case, it would appear that plaintiff’s cause of action did not accrue until the registration of defendants’ lease, and therefore is not barred by the ten years statute of limitations.

Upon a perusal of the whole record, we find no sufficient reason for disturbing the results of the trial.

No error.