Exceptions 1 and 2, to the exclusion of threats made by the deceased against the officers, Cooper and Canup. The judge excluded the evidence of these threats because not communicated to Canup.
In S. v. Blackwell, 162 N. C., 672, it is said: “As a general rule, evidence of the character of the deceased is not relevant to the issue in a trial for homicide, and consequently it is not permissible to show the general reputation as a dangerous or violent man; but when there is evidence showing, or tending to show, that the-prisoner acted in self-defense, under a reasonable apprehension that his life was in danger, or that he was in danger of great bodily harm, evidence of the character of the deceased, as a violent and dangerous man, is admissible, provided the prisoner at the time of the homicide knew of such character, or the nature of the transaction is in doubt.”
The same rule applies to threats. S. v. Hines, 179 N. C., 758, and cases there cited. Moreover, in this case, according to the evidence, the *741deceased was not fighting when Canup, from behind, fired the first shot, which caused the death of the deceased.
The doctrine, as laid down in S. v. Turpin, 77 N. C., 473, and in S. v. Baldwin, 155 N. C., 494, stating the cases in which the proof of nn.com-municated threats are permissible, does not apply in this case, for there were no other threats, which had been communicated which this testimony would have tended to corroborate; the evidence of the transactions was not circumstantial, but direct, and the character of the transaction was not in doubt.
Exception No. 3. It was not error to exclude evidence that the deceased was in the habit of drinking. The evidence was uncontradieted that he was drunk, boisterous, and profane that night. Exception No. 4. It was not error to admit the declaration of the defendant, made some weeks before the homicide as to his general attitude in regard to shooting, while on the police force, that “he would go ahead and the first thing he would do he would shoot somebody and learn them how it>was.” . He said he would not take any chances himself. The jury was entitled to this evidence as showing that the defendant intended to be quick in using a deadly weapon in making arrests.
Exception No. 5. The witnesses for the State testified that the character of the deceased was good. The defense asked this witness, “Do you know how many men it took to arrest him at Sylva when he was drunk?” This question was properly excluded. It was competent in cross-examination to ask questions tending to impeach general character, but not as to particular matters as this would raise innumerable collateral issues. S. v. Holly, 155 N. C., 485, and citations thereto in Anno. Ed.
The assignment of errors in the charge is upon the ground that the charge as a whole is argumentative and equivalent to the expression of opinion by the court, but we do not think this objection is sustained by a perusal of the charge.
No error.