Tbe motion for judgment of nonsuit is upon tbe ground tbat there is no evidence of deliberation and premeditation, wbicb is a necessary and essential element in murder in tbe first degree.
In S. v. Banks, 143 N. C., 657, tbe following charge was approved: “In order to constitute murder in tbe first degree, tbe killing must not only be done with malice aforethought, expressed or implied, but it must be done with willful premeditation and deliberation, and all this must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. '
“Without willful premeditation and deliberation being thus shown, it cannot be murder in the first degree.
“The word ‘willful/ when used in a statute creating an offense, implies the doing of the act purposely and deliberately in violation of law. The meaning of the word ‘premeditation’ is a prior determination to do the act in question. It is not essential that this intention should exist for any considerable period of time before it is carried out. If the determination is formed deliberately and upon due reflection, it makes no difference how soon afterwards the fatal resolve is carried out. An act is done deliberately when done in cold blood, and after a fixed design to do the act.
“No particular time is necessary to constitute premeditation and deliberation, and if the purpose to kill has been deliberately formed, the interval which elapses before its execution is immaterial.”
It is also said in S. v. Bynum, 175 N. C., 780: “It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the deliberation and premeditation need not be of any perceptible length of time. S. v. Jones, 145 N. C., 466; S. v. Banks, 143 N. C., 652; S. v. Daniel, 139 N. C., 549.
“ ‘It is not essential in order to show prima facie premeditation on the part of the prisoner that there should be evidence of preconceived purpose to kill formed at a time anterior to the meeting when it was carried into execution. It is sufficient if the prisoner deliberately determined to kill before inflicting the mortal wound. If there were such purposes deliberately formed, the interval, if only a moment, before its execution is immaterial.’ S. v. McCormac, 116 N. C., 1033, where it is also said, approving Kerr on Homicide, sec. 72: ‘The question whether there has been deliberation is not ordinarily capable of actual proof, but must be determined by the jury from the circumstances.’ ”
The absence of adequate provocation, preparation of a deadly weapon, proof that there was no quarreling before the killing are circumstances tending to prove premeditation and deliberation (S. v. Daniels, 164 N. C., 464), and these and other circumstances were present in this cast.
The defendant was engaged in an unlawful act at the time, and the jury might well infer from the evidence that he was notified of the approach of the officers by some one who whistled as a signal; that he *726heard the notice, because there was a response to it; tbat be bad plenty of time and opportunity to escape and would not do so, preferring to stand bis ground; tbat be beard and saw tbe officers wben tbey were twenty steps away, and instead of leaving at tbat time stood witb back to tbe still and pistol in band; tbat be sbot without a word, and for tbe purpose of killing, pursuant to bis declaration in tbe summer to tbe witness Norman, “Tbat if be were blockading and an officer interfered witb him be would shoot bis way out,” and this would be evidence of a fixed purpose to kill formed prior to tbe act of killing which meets tbe requirements of the law.
Tbe statement of Norman was competent under tbe authority of S. v. Howard, 82 N. C., 623, in which evidence of a declaration made by the prisoner twelve months before tbe homicide bearing upon tbe act of killing and tbe motive was admitted.
There are other exceptions in tbe record, which we have carefully examined, but tbey are without merit and require no discussion.
Tbe charge to tbe jury was fair and accurate, and covered tbe different contentions of tbe parties.
The case itself is one of peculiar interest. On one band, tbe sheriff of a county has been killed while in tbe performance of bis duty, and it must be understood tbat tbe officers of tbe law will be protected, and that those who resist or interfere in tbe performance of tbeir duties will be severely punished.
On tbe other band, we have a mountain boy who volunteered before be bad reached tbe age requiring him to respond under tbe Selective Draft Law, and who spent eleven months in France, and while there was in four battles. During this period be bad to undergo strict discipline and training witb but one thought and purpose, and tbat was to teach him to kill, and as expeditiously as possible. How far this training, which may be all be ever bad, and bis familiarity witb blood and death while in service, have influenced this crime we cannot know.
We have, however, only to deal with the conduct of the trial in the Superior Court, and in that we find
No error.