after stating tbe foregoing material facts: Tbe right to bave tbe place of trial changed from Beaufort County to Dare County would seem to be clear upon tbe facts. Why tbe venue of tbe action was laid in Beaufort County does not appear. It manifestly was not tbe proper county, as none of tbe parties resided therein; tbe cause of action did not arise in that county; nor was any of tbe land to be affected by tbe judgment, and described in tbe deed of trust, situated therein; nor was tbe business of tbe companies, or any of them, usually done in that county. But Dare County answered all these requirements. Rev., 419, 423, 424. Tbe plaintiff, as we bave remarked, is a Virginia corporation, and tbe defendants are New York corporations, and those sections fix tbe venue, which does not include Beaufort County. Tbe law provides that actions for tbe following causes must be tried in tbe county where tbe subject of tbe action, or some part thereof, is situated, subject to tbe power' of tbe court to change tbe place of trial, in tbe following cases:
1. For tbe recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein, or for tbe determination in any form of such right or interest, and for injuries to real property.
2. For tbe foreclosure of a mortgage on real property, etc. Rev., 419.
An action against a corporation created by or under tbe laws of any other State, government, or country may be brought in tbe Superior Court of any county in which tbe cause of action arose, or in which it' usually did business, or in which it has property, or in which tbe plaintiffs, or either of them, shall reside. Rev., 423. This action was brought for tbe purpose of setting aside tbe deed of trust, and obtaining a lien thereon superior and prior thereto. It, therefore, comes within tbe operation of Rev., 419 (not to mention tbe other sections which are applicable), because tbe plaintiff seeks tbe determination, in some form, of an estate or interest in real property. We held in Wofford v. Hampton, 173 N. C., 686, that a creditors’ bill for setting aside an alleged fraudulent deed of a debtor to bis wife was triable only in tbe county where tbe land, or some part thereof, is situated. Tbe object of this action is to establish a claim and to annul, for fraud, a deed of trust on lands in Dare County, where tbe cause of action arose.
There is a suggestion that tbe motion to remove tbe case for trial to Dare County was not made within tbe time prescribed by tbe statute, but this appears to us to be an erroneous view of tbe case. It is certain that tbe insurance company and tbe trust company made their application for removal in time, and, even if tbe other defendant was tardy, it could not, by its inaction, prejudice, much less sacrifice, their right of *15removal. These two defendants acted promptly after they were allowed to become parties. They would have been mere interlopers bad they taken action to remove before tbeir entrance into tbe case. A similar question was before tbe Court many years ago in Knowis v. Baker, 4 N. C. (Anno. Ed.), p. 196, where Judge Cameron said: “No neglect or delay in making tbe application can be fairly imputed to tbe defendant; for although tbe suit has been pending for several terms, yet till be became interested in it, be bad no authority to interfere in it; and tbe application for a removal is made at tbe same term at which be is made a party to tbe suit.” Besides, tbe defendants could not judicially have known what was tbe cause of action, and that it was removable to tbe proper venue, until tbe complaint was filed. As we have said, if tbe Dare Lumber Company was too late, or bad waived its right, it did not deprive tbe other defendants of theirs.-
After providing for tbe venue of actions concerning real property (Rev., 419), tbe statute declares that “in all other cases, tbe action shall be tried where tbe plaintiffs or defendants, or any of them, reside.” Rev., 424. None of tbe parties reside in Beaufort County, as they are all nonresidents.
There was no error in the order.
Affirmed.