Tbe defendant was indicted for selling liquor and for baying liquor for sale. There was evidence as to the sale of the liquor and of its possession for the purpose of sale at Morrow’s Grove camp meeting the first Sunday of August, 1919. In order to sbow tbat the defendant bad the liquor in bis possession for sale the State proposed to prove tbat a year before the time of tbis transaction the defendant bad liquor in bis possession, and sold the same to several persons. Tbis evidence was admitted, and the defendant excepted. Tbe ruling was erroneous. When offenses are so connected witb, or related, to eacb other tbat the commission of one tends to sbow the intent witb which the other was committed, it becomes competent to introduce evidence of the commission of an offense of the same sort as tbat being investigated for the purpose of showing intent, but when the crimes are wholly independent of eacb other, even though they are crimes of the same bind, such evidence, being irrelevant, is inadmissible. 12 Cyc., 495; Gray v. Cartwright, 174 N. C., 49. There are some exceptions to the rule, but tbis case does not fall within any of them. It was held in S. v. Murphy, 84 N. C., 742, tbat evidence of a collateral offense of the same character, and connected witb tbat for which the defendant is being tried, and tending to prove bis intent, or guilty knowledge, when tbat is an essential element of the crime, is admissible. But the two offenses, in tbis case, have no such connection or relation as to make the possession and sale of liquor in Lincoln County evidence of the intent or purpose witb which the defendant bad possession of liquor in Iredell County one year afterwards. It may also be said tbat the transactions are so widely separated in respect to time and place, and are so clearly void of any connection witb eacb other, tbat they cannot be brought within the reason of the rule we have stated, admitting evidence of collateral crimes to prove motive, or intent. The eases of S. v. Winner, 153 N. C., 602; S. v. Stancill, 178 N. C., 683, and S. v. Simons, ibid., 679, and Wharton Cr. Ev. (10 ed.), p. 60, so much relied on by the State, are not authorities for its position, being based on a different state of facts, and upon reasons entirely inapplicable to the question now presented. We said in S. v. Stancill, supra: “Tbe testimony as to the theft of the Wilkinson tobacco was offered merely to sbow the intent witb which the defendants stole tbis tobacco, and not to prove the accu-*770sation substantively. It was sufficiently connected with, the main charge to render it competent for this purpose. Tbe tobacco was all taken to Raymond Stancill’s, the common storehouse for the loot of these defendants. It was but a. part of a series of transactions carried out in pursuance of the original design, and it was contemplated by them in the beginning, that they should plunder the tobacco barns in the neighborhood, and this was one of them. Tbe jury might well have inferred this common purpose from the evidence. Robbing Wilkinson was a part of the common design, and done in furtherance of it. Proof of the commission of other like offenses to show the scienter, intent, or motive is generally competent when the crimes are so connected or associated that this evidence will throw light upon that question.”
There must be another trial to correct the error in admitting tbe testimony to which the defendant objected.
New trial.