It is the generally accepted principle that the highest bidder at a judicial sale is only regarded as a preferred proposer, and *448that be bas no independent right in the property or the suit until the sale bas been reported to the court and confirmed. Tbus, in Harrell v. Blythe, 140 N. C., 415, it was beld that “judicial sales are only conditional, and are not complete until reported to and confirmed by the court, and the bid may be rejected and the sale set aside if, in the exercise of its sound discretion, the court should think proper to do so, and Walker, J., delivering the opinion, further states the position as follows: “When land is sold under a decree of the court, the purchaser acquires no independent right. He is regarded as a mere preferred proposer until confirmation which is the judicial sanction or the acceptance of the court, and, until it is obtained, the bargain is not complete.” Joyner v. Futrell, 136 N. C., 301, and many other well considered eases are to the same effect. And this “confirmation of the sale” referred to and contemplated by these authorities means confirmation that bas been fixed and determined according to the course and practice of the court. And, when an appeal is taken in apt time from the clerk to the judge, the question under our procedure, is open to revision and such further orders and decrees on bis part as the right and justice of the case may require, and to be beard and decided by him on the same or such additional evidence as may aid him to correct conclusion in the matter.
It is well understood that the action of the clerk, in approving or setting aside judicial sales, is an appealable order. This bas been so held in authoritative cases construing the general statutes regulating appeals from the clerk to the judge. Rev., secs. 610-11-12-13, and the ruling is emphasized and extended by sec. 614, providing that whenever any civil action or special proceeding, begun before the clerk of any Superior Court, shall be, for any ground whatever, sent to the Superior Court, before the judge, the judge shall have jurisdiction, etc., etc. Taylor v. Carrow, 156 N. C., 6; Beckwith, ex parte, 124 N. C., 111; McMillan v. McMillan, 123 N. C., 577; Lovinier v. Pearce, 70 N. C., 169.
This being a proceeding to sell land to make assets, in the due administration of an estate and on appeal taken in apt time, it having been made to appear that the property was bid off at an undervalue, that fact confirmed and established by an advanced bid of 20 per cent, in our opinion, bis Honor was in the provident exercise of bis powers in setting aside the bid made, and ordering a resale. Tbe more recent cases of Ex parte Garrett, 174 N. C., 343, and Upchurch v. Upchurch, 173 N. C., 88, are decisions construing sec. 2513, regulating sales for partition, and which seem to confer on the purchaser the right of confirmation after 20 days from report of sale filed, and when no objection is made before motion for confirmation entered.
*449Whether these cases correctly interpret the statute referred to or are in necessary conflict with the principles approved by the Court in Taylor v. Carrow, 156 N. C., 6, a decision also on the proper procedure in partition cases is not now before us, the instant case, as stated, being a petition to sell land for assets which comes in this respect under a different statute, permissive in terms, Eev., 723, and thus far governed by the general principles appertaining to judicial sales to which we have heretofore adverted.
We find no error in the record, and the judgment of his Honor is
Affirmed.