after stating the facts: We doubt if the judgment is a final one, so that an appeal will lie from it, as there were other things to be done, but waiving this question for the present, we will consider the exceptions so as not to prolong the litigation.
*406The referee found that a valid attachment had been issued and levied upon the defendants’ property, and it is objected by the latter that this was not a finding of fact as to the fraud in disposing of the property. But we regard this as immaterial. The judge correctly ruled that the attachment was properly issued, and in the absence of any special findings of fact by him we must assume that he found those facts which would support his order. Lumber Co. v. Buhmann, 160 N. C., 385; Gardiner v. May, 172 N. C., 192; McLeod v. Gooch, 162 N. C., 122; Pharr v. R. R., 132 N. C., 423.
If the defendants desired a specific finding of the facts it should have requested it. Lumber Co. v. Buhmann, supra; Gardiner v. May, supra, citing McLeod v. Gooch, supra. But we need not longer dwell on this matter, as upon an examination of the.affidavit we are of the opinion that it contains statements from which he could fairly and reasonably find, as he evidently did, that the defendant had not only violated its plainly expressed agreement that it would not remove the lumber without assigning the bill of lading to the plaintiff, but that the defendant had actually shipped its property secretly and surreptitiously, with the intent to hinder, delay, and defeat its creditors. Why should it have shipped, in the manner it did, without transferring the bill of lading in direct breach of its promise and without giving the plaintiff any notice of what it intended to do? This was a very suspicious circumstance, and the defendant’s entire conduct was calculated to impress the judge with the conviction, that its purpose was not an honest one, as it had attempted, as fast as it could do so, to put its property beyond the reach of the plaintiff, when it was caught in the act. In passing upon such questions we are permitted some latitude in finding the fact of fraud. There was no reason for such hasty and clandestine action if the intent was a fair and innocent one. Our conclusion that the judge was right, in any view, when he refused to vacate the attachment, makes it immaterial to discuss the exceptions as to the finding of the referee upon the same question. The fraudulent disposition of its property by defendant, as alleged in the attachment proceedings, was entirely collateral to the main issue in the ease, which was whether defendant was. indebted to the plaintiff, and if so, in what amount. Such an attachment is intended by the law to place the property in its custody as a security for the payment of the debt, if finally there is a judgment for it.
The statute provides that “in case judgment be entered for plaintiff in the action, the sheriff shall satisfy the same out of the property attached by him if it shall be sufficient for that purpose,” and then the method of doing so is prescribed. Rev., sec. 784. It has been held that attachment is simply a levy before judgment to preserve and make *407effective tbe ultimate recovery of tbe plaintiff, and when execution is issued upon tbe judgment, it is bis duty to sell tbe attached property. Mfg. Co. v. Steinmetz, 133 N. C., 194 (by Chief Justice Clark), citing Gamble v. Rhyne, 80 N. C., 183. Where tbe court has tbe custody of property it will be retained to await tbe result of tbe action and to satisfy any judgment that may be recovered. Lemly v. Ellis, 143 N. C., 200. Under this section tbe sheriff, upon receiving execution, is directed to sell tbe property previously attached and is invested with as much power and authority to act in tbe premises as if an execution, in tbe form of a venditioni exponas, bad been issued to him .specially commanding him to sell tbe particular property. May v. Getty, 140 N. C., 310. It was not alleged that tbe debt itself was fraudulently contracted, and therefore no issue of fraud was involved. Tbe fraud consisted in removing tbe property with an intent to defeat a recovery of plaintiff’s claim, and that was a collateral fact. Mfg. Co. v. Steinmetz, supra, is directly in point. The second head-note states: “Where ancillary proceedings of attachment are brought with tbe main action, and tbe attachment is not discharged, it is not error to condemn tbe attached property for sale to pay tbe judgment, as tbe sheriff would be required to sell tbe same upon issuance of execution.”
Tbe referee found that tbe attachment was validly issued, and tbe presiding judge affirmed all of his findings of fact and conclusions of law. As to tbe referee’s findings of fact, there was evidence to support them, and they were fully considered and approved by tbe judge. When this is tbe case, we do not review them here. Tbe authorities to this effect are numerous. Battle v. Mayo, 102 N. C., 413; Lewis v. Covington, 130 N. C., 541; Moore v. Westbrook, 156 N. C., 482; Thompson v. Smith, 160 N. C., 256; McCullers v. Cheatham, 163 N. C., 61; Montcastle v. Wheeler, 167 N. C., 258; Simmons v. Groom, ibid., 271; Comrs. v. Abee Bros., 175 N. C., 701. We have examined tbe evidence and find that it supports tbe referee’s findings of fact. Tbe point was made that tbe decision, on tbe motion to vacate the attachment, is res judicata. Roulhac v. Brown, 87 N. C., 1; Pasour v. Lineberger, 90 N. C., 159. This is true so long as tbe order is unreversed, but it is not material in tbe view taken by us of tbe case. We need not decide whether another motion to vacate could have been made upon new facts, as no such motion was made.
There was no error in tbe rulings and judgment below.