As stated in Jones v. R. R., 176 N. C., 260, “It is the accepted principle in our procedure that' a verdict must be interpreted and allowed significance by proper reference to the testimony and charge of the court,” and when so considered, the verdict in this case establishes the fact that the plaintiff’s intestate had gone upon the steps of the caboose in company with the conductor and in,the performance of his duty, and while on the steps he was thrown to the ground and under the train because the train was checked and stopped in an unusual and extraordinary manner.
The court charged the jury that they could not answer the first issue in the affirmative unless the defendant “caused said train to suddenly and violently check up or stop in such an unusual and extraordinary manner as to cause plaintiff’s intestate to be violently thrown off the car upon which he was riding,” and the finding upon the first issue in response to this charge disposes of the defendant’s exceptions to the charges on the issue of assumption of risk because, as held in the J ones case, supra, the employee does not assume the risk “in cases of unusual and instant negligence and under circumstances which afforded the injured employee no opportunity to know of the conditions or appreciate the attendant dangers. This doctrine of assumption of risk is based upon knowledge or a fair and reasonable opportunity to know, and usually this knowledge and opportunity must come in time to be of use.”
Substantially the same objection was made to the charge of the court in the Jones case, and the Court, dealing with the exception of the defendant, said, “But having restricted the fact of liability on the first issue to the single question whether the engineer made the-flying switch negligently by bringing his engine to an unnecessary and unusual and sudden stop, and this having been determined in plaintiff’s favor, the court, under the authorities, was justified in ruling that there could be *183ho assumption of risk, and bis definition was without appreciable significance and should not be allowed to effect the result.”
This fits the facts of the present case and would have justified his Honor in going further than he did, and in instructing the jury that if the intestate of the plaintiff was thrown from the train by reason of an unusual and extraordinary stop, which is the finding on the first issue, that there would be no assumption of risk. The authorities supporting this principle are cited and discussed in the learned and valuable opinion of Associate Justice Hoke and the case of Boldt v. R. R., 245 U. S., 442, on which the defendant relied, is considered and distinguished.
The exception to the charge on contributory negligence, in that the court failed to submit to the jury the alleged negligence of the intestate in going upon the steps and in not holding to the grab-iron, is not supported by the evidence as the conductor testified that he had locked the door of the caboose, thereby forcing the intestate either upon the platform or the steps, and that the intestate was standing on the steps in order that he might alight in the performance of his duty to open the switch, and the evidence shows that he had hold of the grab-iron when he was thrown from the train. We see nothing in this tending to prove negligence.
No error.