When a citizen is put on trial for a crime, and a jury, properly sworn and empaneled, have rendered a verdict of “Not guilty,” or verdict which, by fair intendment, has that significance, the defendant is entitled to have the same received and recorded as rendered, and as a rule it must be acted upon according to its true intent and meaning. In this jurisdiction it may not be questioned by appeal, nor can it be set aside or materially altered by the trial judge, to defendant’s prejudice, nor by the jury itself, after the same has been finally received and recorded. S. v. Whisenant, 149 N. C., 515; S. v. Savery, 126 N. C., 1083; S. v. Arrington, 7 N. C., 571; Clark’s Criminal Procedure, 485; Chitty’s Criminal Law, 657; 12 Cyc., 701.
*743In S. v. Whisenant, supra, tbe principle applicable is stated as follows : “Tbe verdict, tben, as stated, amounted, by fair intendment, to a verdict of not guilty. As said in Clark’s Criminal Procedure, 486, ‘A verdict is not bad for informality or clerical errors in tbe language of it, if it is sucb tliat it can be clearly seen wbat is intended. It is to bave a reasonable intendment and is to receive a reasonable construction, and must not be avoided, except from necessity.’ Tbis being a correct interpretation of tbe verdict as rendered by tbe jury, it was not witbin tbe province or power of tbe court, after tbey were discharged, to amend or alter their deliverance, in a matter of substance, to defendant’s prejudice.” Clark, 487. And our own1 decisions on both propositions cited from Clark are in substantial accord with tbe author. S. v. Arrington, 7 N. C., 571. In tbis case it was^beld, among other things, “That wherever a prisoner, either in terms or effect, is acquitted by tbe jury, tbe verdict as returned should be recorded.” And Chief Justice Taylor, in a concurring opinion, speaking to tbis question, said: “Some of tbe harsh rules of tbe common law in relation to criminal trials bave been gradually softened by tbe improved-spirit of tbe times;.and tbis, among others, is relaxed in modern practice, where tbe jury bring in a verdict of acquittal. It is considered as bearing too bard on tbe prisoner, and is seldom practiced. Hawk., ch. 47, secs. 11, 12. I think tbis course of proceeding is fit to be imitated here, whenever a prisoner, either in terms or effect, is acquitted by tbe jury, and that in all sucb cases tbe verdict should be recorded, although I am persuaded that tbey were desired to reconsider their verdict in tbis case with tbe purest intention and solely with a view that tbey might correct tbe mistake tbey bad committed. Tbe verdict first returned ought to bave been recorded, and it ought to be done now, valeat quantum, valere potest. Tbe effect will be tbe same as if a verdict of acquittal were recorded, but I think it most regular to put upon tbe record wbat tbe jury bave found.”
Tbe only exception recognized in tbis jurisdiction is that of fraud in tbe trial, and procuring of tbe verdict on tbe part of tbe defendant or those acting for him, and to an extent that makes it manifest that in fact and in truth there has been no real trial and defendant was not in jeopardy by reason of it. S. v. Cale, 150 N. C., 805-809; S. v. Moore, 136 N. C., 581; S. v. Swepson, 79 N. C., 632; Holloran v. State, 80 Ind., 586; S. v. Cole, 48 Mo., 70; 1 Chitty Crim. L., 657.
There is no evidence or claim of fraud in tbis instance, and tbe ver-’ diet must therefore stand as tbe true deliverance in tbe cause.
In S. v. Haywood, 94 N. C., 847, tbe verdict in favor of defendant, which was set aside by tbe court, was on a preliminary issue, whether tbe defendant was sane and capable of conducting bis defense to tbe indictment, and not one of acquittal, as' in tbis case. Nor do we find *744anything in the record to justify tbe further detention of defendant as a criminal, nor for an order to make inquiry into his mental condition, with a view of having him confined in the department of the “dangerous insane” in the penitentiary. The 'verdict of “Not guilty” having been duly rendered, defendant is thereby relieved of any criminal aspect of the charge; and in reference to the order of inquiry into his mental condition, we are of opinion that the law under which his Honor evidently proceeded (chapter 97, sec. 4618, Revisal) does not extend to the charge contained in this bill of indictment or to any charge of like grade. The section in question is a part of subchapter 7, chapter 97, sections 4612-4622, inclusive, establishing a department for the dangerous insane in the penitentiary; and while some portions of this statute seem broad enough to include all cases of persons charged with crime, the particular section involved here is of much more restricted meaning. It provides that when a person is accused of the crime of murder, attempt at murder, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, highway robbery, train wrecking, or other crime, shall be acquitted, upon trial, upon the ground of insanity, or shall be found by the court to be without mental capacity to undertake his defense or to receive sentence after conviction, the court before which such proceedings are had shall detain such person in custody until such inquisition be had in regard to his mental condition, the section then making, further provision for the judges to notify certain parties, direct the summoning of witnesses, and himself conducting the inquiry, presently or at a later date. It is a recognized principle of statutory construction that when particular and specific words or acts, the subject of a statute, are followed by general words, the latter must as a rule be confined to acts and things of the same kind. S. v. Goodrich, 84 Wis., 359; Nichols et al. v. State, 127 Ind., 406; Ex parte Muckinfuss, 52 Tex. Civ. App., 467; 2 Lewis’ Sutherland Stat. Construction (2d Ed.), sec. 422; 36 Cyc., 1119. As said in the Texas case, supra, it is a principle especially applicable to statutes which define and punish crimes, and is imperatively required in reference to the section considered. Our General Assembly clearly has the power to establish rules and regulations for the care and custody of the insane; indeed, it is enjoined upon it here as' a constitutional duty, but such regulations must be in reasonable regard for the rights of persons and property. The well considered case of In re Boyette, 136 N. C., 415, opinion by our former associate, ■Mr. Justice Connor, is in full approval of the position that an order detaining a citizen as an insane person, in a hospital, asylum, or otherwise, is a restraint of his liberty within the constitutional guarantees for his protection. The statute, therefore, or this portion of it, conferring as it does upon the trial judge the unusual power of detaining a citizen who has been acquitted by the jury, may become highly penal in *745character; and, having specifically designated for its operation the crimes of' murder, assault with intent to murder, rape, and assault with intent to commit rape, highway robbery, train wrecking, arson, all crimes of higher grade and in themselves importing serious menace to others, in adding thereto the general terms, “or other crimes,” by correct interpretation, means and was intended to mean other crimes of like kind and grade, and does not extend to or include crimes like the present, misdemeanors which are not necessarily and inherently vicious or threatening and may be and not infrequently are committed with very little ■demonstration of force. In this very instance, while the testimony does not accompany the record, the justice’s warrant, initiating these proceedings and made a part of the case, charges that the “offense was committed by threats and saying that no officer could take him alive,” giving clear indication that no violence had been committed. Undoubtedly, if in the course of this or any other criminal investigation it should be disclosed by the testimony that a defendant’s mind had become so far deranged and the insanity had taken such form, as to threaten the safety of his family or friends or neighbors, the magistrate, as a peace officer or under other provisions of the law, could order his present restraint, that proper steps might be taken with a view to his lawful commitment and care, but such conditions are not presented by the record, nor does such power arise under the present section in any charge of this kind, from the mere fact that a jury has acquitted a defendant on the ground “that he did not have sufficient mental capacity to commit a crime.”
On the record, we are of opinion thát defendant is entitled to an order for his discharge without more, and this will be certified, that the order of inquiry be set aside and defendant’s motion for his discharge be allowed him.
Eeversed.