There is authority for the position taken by the defendants that judgments do not ordinarily operate as estoppels between plaintiffs or defendants, usually having this effect only as between adversary parties, but it does not appear that the decree in the dower proceeding was relied on to estop the defendants from denying that John *487Eiddle was tbe owner of the land in controversy when he died, and •clearly the evidence was competent as a quasi admission of Alfred Eid-dle, who was a party and who failed to answer the allegation that John Eiddle died seized in fee of the land, and as contradicting his present claim of ownership by possession. It was also admissible to show the character of the possession by the widow in order that this might be tacked to the possession of the husband to perfect the title of the heir. Atwell v. Shook, 133 N. C., 387.
The parol evidence as to the contents of the lost deed was also properly admitted, as the petitioners had traced the deed to the possession of the defendant and had given him notice to produce it. 17 Cyc., 532; Overman v. Clemmons, 19 N. C., 192; Murchison v. McLeod, 47 N. C., 241.
The record of the entry was introduced after the defendant Eiddle testified that he entered into possession of the land in 1879, and had held it, claiming it as his own, and was proper for the consideration of the jury as tending to contradict him, as only vacant and unappropriated lands can be entered.
The motion for judgment of nonsuit could not be sustained because the evidence of the petitioners tended to prove that John Eiddle had held possession of the land adversely for more than thirty years, which, if believed, was sufficient to show title out of the State and to vest title in him.
John Eiddle testified: “I know the land described in the complaint all my life. My father lived on it. He moved on it after I was married. My brother was not grown. He lived on it thirty or thirty-five years — until he died. He built houses on it and rented a part of the land to other parties.”
There was other evidence that John Eiddle held possession for more than twenty years, and that his widow continued in possession ten or twelve years after his death.
Chapter 195, Laws 1917, which provides that in all actions involving title, title shall be conclusively presumed to be out of the State unless the State is'a party or.it is the trial of a protested entry, has no application because this proceeding was commenced before 1 May, 1917.
No error.