This is an action to recover damages by reason of tbe •defendant’s dam at Buckhorn backing water upon the plaintiff’s land. The plaintiffs contend that their lands have been thus damaged, while the defendant contends that whatever damage, if any, the plaintiffs sustained was not due to defendant’s dam, but to natural causes and the negligence of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs’ land lies upon Cape Fear Biver six or seven miles above defendant’s dam. It has been subject to overflow from time immemorial. It is admitted that the greatest overflow which has occurred in the memory of men now living was in the memorable freshet of August, 1908, when the defendant’s dam was broken; and the plaintiffs contend that when it was rebuilt after said freshet, it had been raised and caused the water in the river to rise several feet higher than before, causing backwater to overflow and sob the lands of the plaintiffs. This was a disputed issue of fact, upon which there was a great deal of evidence, and the jury have found in favor of the plaintiffs.
Exceptions 1 and 4 are not mentioned in defendant’s brief, and are therefore abandoned. Eule 34 of this Court.
Exceptions. 2 and 3, to the admission of testimony, cannot be sustained for the reason, if for no other, that there was no answer made to either question, and, so far as the record shows, the evidence to which the defendant objected did not get to the jury.
Exception 5 is because, during the argument of plaintiffs’ counsel, he made a statement of a matter of fact as to which there was no evidence, but the counsel for the defendant interrupted, calling to the court’s attention that there was no evidence on the point. Thereupon the judge at once stated to the jury that there was no evidence to that effect, when counsel for the plaintiff said that he was not arguing that there was evidence, for there was none, but only that there might have been such an occurrence. There was nothing further said or done, and no exception was taken. The assignment of error in the case on appeal cannot cure the failure to except at the time. Harrison v. Dill, 169 N. C., 544; S. v. Tyson, 133 N. C., 699; S. v. Davenport, 156 N. C., 611. Besides, *74tbe statement of plaintiffs’ counsel of matter not in evidence was promptly corrected by tbe judge.
Exceptions 6, 7, 8, and 10 are to parts of tbe judge’s charge wbicb are, in effect, substantially tbe same as to tbe charge made by the judge in Power Corp. against this defendant, 168 N. C., 219, wbicb tbe Court held did not require discussion.
Exception-6 was because tbe court charged tbe jury: “If you find from tbe greater weight of the evidence that tbe plaintiffs’ property was wrongfully damaged by tbe ponding of water by tbe defendants’ dam, tbe measure of tbe damages is tbe difference in tbe value of tbe same before and after tbe injury complained of.”
Exception 7 is because tbe court charged tbe jury: “Tbe proper inquiry is, What was its market value before tbe alleged injury? in view of any uses to wbicb it might have been applied and tbe uses to wbicb it was adapted and tbe uses for which it was used, and you should then say, after making that inquiry, what its present value is, and tbe difference will be your answer to tbe fourth issue.”
Exception 8 is because tbe judge charged: “If tbe jury shall find from tbe greater weight of tbe evidence that tbe plaintiffs’ property has been damaged by tbe ponding of tbe water by tbe defendant’s dam, tbe measure of damages is tbe difference in tbe value of tbe same before and after tbe injury complained of.”
Exception 10 is because tbe court charged: “On tbe fourth issue, gentlemen, tbe court instructs you that if tbe plaintiffs are entitled to recover, they can recover permanent damages to their lands, past, present, and prospective, caused by tbe wrongful ponding back of tbe water upon their lands or damaging their lands, and tbe measure of damages would be tbe difference between tbe value of said lands before such wrongful ponding of water and tbe value thereof after such ponding.”
These instructions were correct. Brown v. Power Co., 140 N. C., 342-345; R. R. v. Mfg. Co., 169 N. c., 156. If there has been a general enhancement in tbe value of lands due to extrinsic causes, it is tbe plaintiffs, not tbe defendant, who can complain of these instructions.
Exception 9 is because tbe court charged tbe jury: “If you find from tbe greater weight of tbe evidence, tbe burden being upon tbe plaintiff, that tbe water in Cape Fear River was wrongfully ponded back, upon, or in any way damaged tbe plaintiffs’ lands, tbe court instructs you that tbe plaintiffs were not under any legal duty to drain such lands to avert or mitigate damages thereto.”
This charge is correct. Roberts v. Baldwin, 155 N. C., 281; Waters v. Kear, 168 N. C., 246; Barcliff v. R. R., ib., 270; Cardwell v. R. R., 171 N. C., 367.
*75In the latter case the Court said tbat the defendant could not rely upon the defense tbat the plaintiff should bave reduced bis damages by cutting drainage ditches, for the injured proprietor is not required to incur such expense in order to avoid damages when the defendant has wrongfully diverted the surface water from its natural flow to bis damage. In this case the court went farther than the defendant was entitled to by immediately adding tbat the jury “should'not award the plaintiffs any damages in this case for the loss or depreciation in their property by reason of their failure to ditch their land, unless their failure to properly ditch it was rendered useless or unnecessary by reason of the water baching on it from Cape Fear Eiver as the result of the raising of the dam by the defendant.” And further, tbat “This defendant is not to be taxed with any loss by reason of the plaintiffs’ failure to properly cultivate bis lands, but only for backing water upon it; and if the plaintiffs failed to ditch their land when it could bave been done, then this defendant is not to be charged with their neglect or failure.” If there is any conflict in these instructions, the defendant cannot complain, because in neither instruction was there any error of which the defendant could complain.
"We cannot pass without notice tbat this action, began in 1909, has just reached this Court. Such delay of justice -should not occur.
No error.