From the above statement of facts found by the judge and the admissions, it is clear that at the time of the tax sale in February, 1916, at which A. G. Calhoun bought, the lands in controversy were still a part of the estate of S. R. Townsend and subject to the assessments against said lands in favor of said drainage district under which it was sold at a sale in all respects regular as set out in the tax certificate and found by the judge.
At May Term, 1917, Calhoun consented that the paper executed to bim by the sheriff when be paid the purchase price should be treated as a tax certificate, and this concession by bim eliminates all controversy as to whether it was a deed for the land or not. There is no controversy now before the Court whether R. C. Townsend bad notice, because the record shows that be was served with such notice and appeared at May Term, 1917, and was given ninety days after that bearing to pay for and redeem the lands; 'and it was decreed that upon bis failure to do this Calhoun would be entitled to a deed from the sheriff, which would operate as a complete conveyance of R. C. Townsend’s interest.
A. Gr. Calhoun bought at tbe sale in February, 1916, which tbe judge finds to have been regular in all respects. By one means or another, tbe confirmation of that sale has been postponed until now nearly two years have elapsed since tbe sale. It was by consent of said Calhoun that, at May Term, 1917 — now six months ago — ninety days were allowed R. 0. Townsend in which to redeem tbe land, though be was a claimant under an unregistered, deed which be bad made no attempt to put on record and which was not recorded till 5 November, 1917, since tbe case was docketed here.
In Banks v. Lane, 170 N. C., 14, it was held that the landowner, at the time of the establishment of the drainage district, was the only necessary party to the proceedings, and that lien holders and mortgage holders need not be made parties, and that the establishment of the drainage district created the presumption that the land would be bene*559fited by tbe drainage district more tban the burdens assessed against it for such purpose. This was held true against the purchase money mortgages under the facts recited in that case. That case was reheard and reaffirmed 171 N. C., 505. The second opinion pointed out that if the plaintiff was the landowner, and had not been served, the remedy was by motion in the drainage proceeding and not otherwise.
In this ease, at the time of the tax sale in February, 1916, the record discloses that E. C. Townsend had no interest in the lands, but on the contrary shows that the title then was still in the estate of S. E. Townsend, who was a party to the proceedings to establish a drainage district and whose estate had full notice of the proceedings to sell for default in payment of the assessment.
■ • As set out in appellant’s brief, Laws 1911, chap. 67, sec. 12 (Gregory's Supplement, sec. 4018, and subsections), provide that sales for default in payment of assessments in drainage districts shall in all respects, except as to time, be under the laws for the collection of State and county taxes. The court in this case found that the sale February, 1916, by the sheriff was in all respects regular. The consent by Calhoun at May Term, 1917, that E. C. Townsend should have ninety days in which to redeem was an act of grace on his part and gives to E. C. Townsend no right to an extension of time after the lapse o-f said ninety days.
The appellant contends that Eevisal, 2912, requires the purchaser at a tax sale to bring an action to foreclose upon his tax certificate, and that this is his only remedy. In this he is in error, for section 2912 gives this as an additional remedy and uses the following language: “The holder of a deed for real estate sold for taxes shall be entitled to the remedy provided in this section (2912) if he elect to proceed thereunder,” or he may proceed to acquire a deed from the sheriff as otherwise pointed out in sections 2899 to 2907 of the Eevisal.
Every individual purchaser has two remedies, one to proceed under the statute to require a deed, and the other to foreclose by action in court under section 2912. Formerly, if the county was purchaser it had only the right to foreclose (Wilcox v. Leach, 123 N. C., 74), but this was changed by Laws 1901, chap. 558, sec. 18 (now Pell’s Eevisal, 2905), which provides that the sheriff can execute a deed upon the demand of the county commissioners or the governing board of a municipal corporation in the same manner as in cases where individuals have purchased.
In this case, the purchaser, Calhoun, is following his remedy to demand a tax deed, and since the matter has been in court notices have been issued to all parties who might claim an interest since he obtained a judgment against the plaintiffs, executors of S. E. Townsend, who *560claimed to be the owners of the land and who are the parties undel* whom R. 0. Townsend now claims.
Revisal, 2913, provides that the only remedy of the landowner or occupant is that he may redeem, and there is no obligation upon the purchaser to foreclose, and it is provided that this redemption is allowed the owner of the land upon payment of the amount of the purchase price with the statutory interest, as provided by Revisal, 2913, together with all other taxes subsequently paid. This is held in Becks v. Meroney, 135 N. C., 532, to constitute the landowner’s sole remedy.
The plaintiff cites Rexford v. Phillips, 159 N. C., 213, where the Court discusses this matter fully, and after referring to the fact that taxes had been paid and that a tender had been made and rejected, holds that it is the duty of the land claimant to pay the taxes and the statutory-charges, and says: “This is nothing but right, and is no more than the plaintiff should be required to do, in order that his delinquency may not inure to his benefit, and that justice may be done to the defendant who has relieved the land of a charge which would have rested upon if it the plaintiff had performed his duty by listing his property for taxation.”
Revisal, 2909, provides that no person shall be permitted to question the title required by the sheriff’s deed without "first showing that he or the person under whom he daims had title to the property at the■ time of the sale, and that all taxes due upon the property have been paid by such person or the person under whom he claims.” Calhoun’s judgment against the plaintiffs, under whom the appellant claims, is set out in the record, and the appellant does not show that he has paid the taxes, but says expressly that he has not, and he has no right now to question the status of Calhoun.
In Eames v. Armstrong, 146 N. C., 1, the Court discusses this question and cites the cases up to that time under Revisal, 2909. The ajipel-lant is in fact a “volunteer.” He is not a creditor or purchaser for value within the meaning of the Connor Act, and he cannot come into court under his unregistered deed and successfully question Calhoun’s right to a deed when he has not paid or tendered within the ninety days, which were allowed him as an act of grace with Calhoun’s consent, by the judgment of May, 1917, the purchase money with the statutory charges and taxes. In fact, he has been treated in the same manner as if he had title to the lands, though he had none, and he was allowed ninety days in which to redeem when he appeared and said he wished to redeem.
The appellant has had all that S. R. Townsend or his executors could claim, though he was not entitled to stand in their shoes. He is not entitled now to have an addition to the more than six months delay which he has obtained by appealing from a judgment which allowed him *561ninety days as an act of grace. There is no error in the judgment of the court of which he can complain, and we cannot hold that there was. It is ordered, however, that E. 0. Townsend shall be allowed till 1 January, 1918, to comply with the terms of the judgment -appealed from, and on default shall then be in all respects foreclosed from all claim or rights as to the property in question.
Affirmed.