Coward v. Manly, 173 N.C. 716 (1917)

April 18, 1917 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

173 N.C. 716

MIKE COWARD et al. v. JOHN A. MANLY et al.

(Filed 18 April, 1917.)

1. Instructions — Evidence—Appeal and Error — Harmless Error.

Exceptions to the charge of the court upon the question of undue influence in an action to set aside a deed are not considered in this case in which the deed was sustained, there being no evidence thereof.

2. Instructions — Contentions—Appeal and Error — Harmless Error.

Exception that the court did not state certain contentions of the appellant is not sustained, it appearing that the charge as a whole was fair to both parties-, the judge having directed the attention of the jury to all of the material positions taken by them and reasonably arising from the evidence.

Civil ACTION, tried before Lyon, J., at December Term, 1916, of GrBEENE.

This is an action to set aside a deed executed by Anne Coward to ber daughter, upon the ground of want of mental capacity and undue influence.

The jury returned the following verdict:

1. Did Mrs. Martha Ann Coward, on 12 September, 1913, have sufficient mental capacity to execute deed set out in pleadings? Answer: “Yes.”

2. Was the execution of the deed from Martha Ann Coward to Nancy Manly procured by the exercise of undue influence upon the part of the defendant? Answer: “No.”

3. "What is the annual rental value of said land? Answer: --.

There was a judgment in favor of the ■ defendant, and the plaintiffs excepted and apj>ealed.

N. J. Bouse, E. M. La/nd, John G. Anderson, Robert LI. Bouse, and William T. Joyner. for plaintiffs.

Albion Dunn for defendant.

Per Cueiam.

All of the exceptions that are considered in the briefs are to the charge of the court. Two of these bear upon the question of undue influence, but as we find no evidence of undue influence in the record, it is not necessary to consider them.

The other exceptions are to the failure of the court to state certain contentions of the plaintiffs, but upon an examinátion of the charge we find that while some particular view may not have been presented, the charge taken as a whole is fair to both parties and directed the attention of the jury to all of the material positions taken by the plaintiffs and the defendant, and reasonably arising upon the evidence.

We see no reason for disturbing the verdict.

No error.