The sole question presented is whether there was a sufficient agreement in writing, under the statute of frauds, to bind the defendant C. J. Ebbs.
The plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendants which sufficiently described the property and in his second letter inclosed a deed executed by himself and wife for the same. The defendant O. J. Ebbs thereupon wrote out a new deed fully describing the property and setting out the contract and naming the consideration, stating that the deed covered the Bridge Street property and was “made out in accordance with our agreement. . . . Kindly execute the new deed and let us have it back at your earliest convenience, and we will send you the notes and check as per the contract.” This was a sufficient signing under the statute of frauds. The reference in the letter to the deed, taken in connection with the evidence of the plaintiff that the deed put in evidence was the deed that came in the envelope and is the one referred to in Ebbs’ letter of 9 June, is fully sufficient.
The objection that parol evidence was required to prove that the deed put in evidence was that which was sent by Ebbs for plaintiff’s signature and which was afterwards executed and acknowledged by himself and wife in no wise makes in favor of the plea that the contract was not in writing.
The contract is fully set out in the correspondence', and there. is nothing as to the terms of the contract to be added. The terms of the agreement are full and complete, and entirely in writing. It is no infringement of the rule that a contract for sale of land must be in writing to prove by parol the signature of the parties, the delivery of the paper in escrow, or that the two papers came tacked together or in the same envelope. These are collateral matters and form no p-art of the contract itself, which is entirely in writing.
It may be that if there had been evidence that O. J. Ebbs was authorized orally as the agent of P. D. Ebbs and of King to sign the letter, that this would have made him an “agent” duly authorized to sign the contract in their behalf. But such evidence seems not to have been offered, and at any rate the plaintiff did not appeal from the direction of a nonsuit as to them. The contract, whether proven valid as to P. D. Ebbs and King or not, was binding upon 0. J. Ebbs, and judgment was properly taken against him. The carbon copies of plaintiff’s letters were duplicate originals and competent.
The correspondence made a sufficient contract as to 0. J. Ebbs, and in his appeal there is
No error.