Tbe relevant facts in this case are similar to those presented in Lumber Co. v. Wells and Page, just decided, except that here tbe grantor died and tbe time originally provided for removing tbe timber and for which be bad been paid having expired, the grantees *266tendered tbe money dne for an extension, and same is claimed by tbe administrator and tbe beirs at law.
In accordance witb our decision in tbe case of Lumbar Co. v. Wells, we must bold tbat tbe right to tbis fund is in tbe beirs. Tbe title having descended to them, it is from their estate tbat tbe interest arises, and they are entitled to receive tbe purchase price. We are not inadvertent to tbe language of tbe stipulation, tbat tbe price for an extension is to be paid to J. S. Johnston and bis personal representative, or to tbe argument advanced tbat Johnston being tbe absolute and entire owner, at tbe date of tbe original deed, be could make such contract’ as to tbe payment of tbe purchase money for tbe interest conveyed as be saw proper. Assuredly be could, and if he bad conveyed tbe timber for tbe additional period, tbe stipulation would bold, in strictness, as written; but, as we have endeavored to show, this provision in tbe deed for an extension of tbe time was an option, an offer to confer tbe right which matured only at tbe time tbe conditions were complied witb. Tbe ]Droperty was then owned by tbe beirs, and tbe price to be paid for tbe interest then arising out of their ownership must, in our opinion, inure to them.
True, J. S. Johnston might have sold to tbe grantee for tbis additional five years, and tbe purchase price would have gone as be contracted; but, as stated, be only conferred upon tbe grantee tbe right to buy, and tbis being exercised after tbe land descended upon tbe beirs, tbe price must be paid to them.
There is error.