after stating the case: It would seem to be plain that the court did not sustain the demurrers upon the ground that there was a misjoinder of causes of action, because it made no order for a division of them under Eevisal, sec. 476; and it is equally plain that it was not done for the reason that there was a misjoinder of parties, for the judgment would not remove that objection, if it was well taken. The judgment must have been based upon the last two defects assigned in the demurrer, which, by reference to the statute, Eevisal, sec. 474, would not seem to be proper grounds of demurrer, Thames v. Jones, 97 N. C., 121, but of a motion to make the complaint more definite and certain, so that the precise nature of the cause of action may clearly appear.
Eevisal, sec. 474, provides as follows: “The defendant may demur to the complaint when it shall appear upon the face thereof either (1) that the court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant or of *212the subject of tbe action; or (2) that the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue; or (3) that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; or (4) that there is a defect of parties plaintiff or defendant; or (5) that several causes of action have been improperly united; or (6) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”
Section 496 provides as follows: “If irrelevant or redundant matter be inserted in a pleading, it may be stricken out on motion of any person aggrieved thereby; but this motion must be made before answer or demurrer, or before an extension of time to plead is granted. And when the allegations of a pleading are so indefinite or uncertain that the precise nature of the charge or defense is not apparent, the court may require the pleading to be made definite and certain by amendment.” “A motion to strike out alleged improper matter from a complaint will not be considered after an-answer or demurrer is filed, or after an order for time to plead.” Best v. Clyde, 86 N. C., 4.
The first demurrers were directed against the cause of action, but this ground was abandoned in the second group, and, we think, properly so. It appears that' the court overruled the first demurrers and ordered an amendment of the complaint of its own motion so as to show more specifically plaintiff’s title and ownership of the land. Plaintiff contends that this was res judicata as to all the other grounds of demurrer; but we need not decide this question, nor the one as to whether the last two grounds of objection can properly be taken by such a pleading, for we are of the opinion that the court should have overruled the present demurrers. Why the first demurrers were overruled and the last sustained does not clearly appear. As we have said, it would seem from the order made by the court that its ruling was based upon the last two grounds of demurrer, and this is indicated by the fact that there was no' order as to the separation of causes of action or of the parties, and there was nothing left of the demurrers except the objection that the complaint was uncertain, redundant, and not clear and concise in its allegations as required by the statute. It is alleged in the third ground of demurrer that the complaint is “multifarious,” which, in equity pleading, formerly referred to the fault of improperly joining in one bill distinct and independent matters, and thereby confounding them, as, for example, the uniting in one bill of several matters of complaint, perfectly distinct and unconnected, against one defendant, or the demand of several matters of a distinct and independent nature against several defendants in the same bill, Story Eq. PI. (10 Ed.), sec. 271; but we recognize in this definition of the word the same fault in pleading mentioned in Revisal, sees. 474 and 496, as to the improper joinder of parties and causes of action, and the statement of irrelevant matter.
*213Coming down to the real question involved, the complaint states a cause of action clearly enough, but not very concisely, and it may be that the pleading was properly characterized in the argument as prolix; but if that objection is now open to the defendants upon demurrer, the prolixity is not so grave in its extent as to mislead or confuse the defendants or to conceal or obscure, by too much elaboration or redundant words, the real cause of action, and, therefore, to require further amendment of the pleading.
The decision in Daniels v. Fowler, 120 N. C., 14, would seem to completely answer all of the material objections of the defendants. Language could not be more apposite to this case and the precise point raiséd by the demurrer, and could not more effectually dispose of them, than that which is used by the present (Thief Justice in that case, where he said: “If the grounds of the complaint 'arise out of one and the same transaction, or series of transactions, forming one course of dealing, and all tending to one end; if one connected story can be told of the whole,’ it is not multifarious. Ruffin, C. J., in Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C., 313, cited and approved in Young v. Young, 81 N. C., 91; King v. Farmer, 88 N. C., 22, and in Heggie v. Hill, 95 N. C., 303. To same purport is Hamlin v. Tucker, 72 N. C., 502. That the 'main relief may be effectual, the plaintiff may state in his bill any number of conveyances, improperly obtained from him, either at one or more times respecting different kinds of property, and ask to have them all put out of his way, or to have reconveyances; for the several conveyances do not so much constitute distinct subjects of litigation, but are rather so many barricades erected by the defendant to impede the progress of the plaintiff towards his rights.’ Bedsole v. Monroe, supra. 'Where a general right is claimed, arising out of a series of transactions tending to one end, the plaintiff may join several causes of action against defendants who have distinct and separate interests, in order to a conclusion of the whole matter.’ Young v. Young, supra. Under The Code, sec. 267 (1), where the causes of action all arise out of transactions connected with the same subject-matter, a cause of action in tort can be joined with one to enforce an equitable right (Benton v. Collins, 118 N. C., 196); and proceedings for enforcement of legal and equitable rights can be joined. Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C., 311, 316; S. v. Smith, 119 N. C., 856. This is an action for the conversion of the entire estate of the ancestor of the infant plaintiff and to set aside sundry transactions, conveyances, and judgments by means of which the wrong has been done,- in none of-which frauds the ancestor participated. The demurrer for misjoinder was therefore properly overruled.” That case has repeatedly been approved. Fisher v. Trust Co., 138 N. C., 224; Quarry Co. v. Con *214 struction Co., 151 N. C., 345; Ricks v. Wilson, ibid., 46; Hawk v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C., 48; Ayers v. Bailey, 162 N. C., 209. To these may be added Glenn v. Bank, 72 N. C., 626; Benton v. Collins, 118 N. C., 196; Pretzfelder v. Ins. Co., 116 N. C., 491, all decided before Daniels v. Fowler, supra, but to the same effect.
The writer of this opinion did not concur in Fisher v. Trust Co., supra, but agreed to the dissenting views so ably stated by Justice Connor; but be recognizes that the principle of that case has since been thoroughly settled by the decisions of this Court and is now an established rule of pleading, and he has acquiesced in it for that reason.
The complaint, if reduced to its last analysis, or the ultimate and material facts, alleges that the deeds were executed when James Lee was totally deficient in mental capacity, and that he was fraudulently imposed upon and unduly influenced by defendants Ella Lee and Dr. Thornton to execute the deeds, they having conspired to take an unfair and unjust advantage of his mental and physical condition in order to procure them, and that the defendant Mason knew of these facts and participated in the fraud when he took his deed. This states with sufficient clearness a good cause of action, even, though the pleader may have gone into lengthy detail. Blackmore v. Winders, 144 N. C., 215; Brewer v. Wynne, 154 N. C., 467.
Our conclusion is that the demurrers should have been overruled and the defendant required to answer to the merits.