Statutes similar to tbe one before us, providing for tbe drainage of lowlands, have been sustained as a valid exercise of legislative power in several recent decisions. Adams v. Joyner, 147 N. C., 83; Sanderlin v. Luken, 152 N. C., 738, and others. It is also settled in this State and elsewhere tbat it is permissible for tbe General Assembly to give to proof of certain facts tbe effect of establishing prima facie a fact in issue, provided there is a reasonable relation between tbe two. The same rule prevails as to civil and criminal causes, and was very fully considered in S. v. Barrett, 138 N. C., 630.
Tbe Court, in tbat ease, quotes from McLain’s Criminal Law as follows: “Laws-which prescribe tbe evidential force of certain facts by enacting tbat upon proof of such facts a given presumption shall arise, or which determine tbat facts shall constitute'a prima facie case against tbe accused, casting tbe burden of proof upon him of disproving or rebutting tbe presumption, are not generally regarded as unconstitutional, even though they may destroy tbe presumption of innocence. An accused person has no vested right in this or any other presumption or law of evidence or procedure tbat tbe lawmaking power cannot, within constitutional limits, deprive him of. Tbe existing rules of evidence may be changed at any time by legislative enactment”; and adds: “Tbe Legislature of this, and, we presume, every other State, has frequently changed tbe rules of evidence and declared tbat certain facts or conditions, when shown, shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt. Tbe power to do so has always been sustained.”
Tbe rule lias been applied in this State as to crimes in tbe statute against carrying concealed weapons (Rev., see. 3708), which makes tbe possession of a deadly weapon named in tbe statute, about one’s person, prima facie evidence of concealment; in tbe statute making tbe possession of inore than one gallon of intoxicating liquors prima facie evidence *326of having the liquor for sale (S. v. Wilkerson, 164 N. C., 431), and in other statutes, and in civil matters, notably as applied to this case, in the statute (Rev., sec. 1625), making a verified, itemized statement of an account prima facie evidence of its correctness, which has been sustained in several decisions. Knight v. Taylor, 131 N. C., 84; Claus v. Lee, 140 N. C., 552.
It will be observed that the statute only makes, the itemized statement, verified by the oath of the collector, prima facie evidence of the existence and legality of the taxes as well as of the amount, and this permits the introduction of evidence to prove the contrary, and thus gives to the defendant the opportunity of being heard before he is called upon to pay, and, therefore, he is not deprived of his property without due process of law. Kinston v. Loftin, 149 N. C., 257; Kinston v. Wooten, 150 N. C., 298; Tarboro v. Staton, 156 N. C., 508.
In the first of these cases, which is approved in the others, the action was to collect an assessment for street improvements under a statute requiring a suit to be instituted to collect the assessment, and the defendant objected that he had not had notice prior to the levying of the assessment; but it was held that as the assessment had to be enforced in the courts, and as he could be heard when the action was instituted, he was not deprived of his property contrary to the law of the land, the Court saying: “The order for the improvement was formally made, the work has been well done at a reasonable cost, and the amount assessed well within the limit allowed and established by the law; and, in the present suit, instituted as provided by the statute, the defendants have been afforded opportunity to assert and establish every defense available to them, either by reason of irregularity or on the merits. In Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S., 104, Miller, J., delivering the opinion of the Couid, said-: ‘That whenever, by the laws of a State, or by State authority, a tax assessment, servitude, or other burden is imposed upon property for the public use, whether it be for the whole State or for some more limited portion of the community, and those laws provide for a mode of confirming or contesting the charge thus imposed in the ordinary courts of justice, with such notice to the person or such proceeding in regard to the property as is appropriate to the nature of the case, the judgment in such proceeding cannot be said to deprive the owner of his property without due process of law, however obnoxious it may be to other objections.’ The objection of defendant, therefore, urged on the ground that no proper notice was provided for, cannot be sustained.”
We find
No error.