after stating the facts: We are of the opinion that the words' of the deed create a condition subsequent. No precise words are required to make a condition precedent or subsequent. The construction must always be founded on the intention of the parties. If the act or condition required does not necessarily precede the vesting of the estate, but may accompany or follow it, and if the act may be as well done after as before the vesting of the estate, or if from the nature of the act to be-performed and the time required for its performance it is evidently the intention of the parties that the estate shall vest, and the grantee perform the act, after taking possession, then the condition is subsequent. 20 Barbour (N. Y.), 455. The effect of the deed, therefore, was to vest the fee simple of the estate in the grantees, subject to be defeated by a neglect or refusal to perform the condition. It is true that such conditions are construed strictly against the grantor, as they tend to defeat estates, but the construction should be conformable to the letter and obvious intent of the grant, and if there is only one construction which will give effect to all the words of the instrument, it will, of course, he followed. 13 Cyc., 687, 688. The meaning of this deed is clear that the grantees shall see to the maintenance and proper care of the grantors during their joint and several lives, and, failing to do> so, that the deed shall be “void and of no effect.” We have recently discussed the principles applicable to conditions of this sort in deeds, and it would he useless to repeat what is there said. Britton v. Taylor, 168 N. C., 271.
The only question we need consider here is whether there was a sufficient offer to prove facts that would show a violation of the condition. It is stated in the facts admitted that a demand was made by Jane Henson upon the grantees, but we 'are not informed as to its terms,' so that we cannot see that it was of a kind to-put the grantees in default if they did not comply with it. This would be very indefinite proof, and a wholly inadequate admission upon which to declare a vested estate forfeited for breach of a condition. It must appear clearly that there has been a substantial failure to perform the covenant for support before *78the power of the court will be exerted to put au end to the estate conveyed and return it to the grantor.
It is unnecessary to decide as to the legal effect of the deed executed by Jane Henson upon the condition and the right to reenter for its breach, she being the only beneficiary injured by the alleged nonperformance of the grantees. The deed is not before us, and we will not venture a guess as to its contents. A conveyance of the premises by the grantor to a stranger has been held as operating to extinguish the grantor’s rights in certain eases. 13 Cyc., 707, and note 96, and cases cited; Berenbroick v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 23 Hun. (N. Y. Appellate Div. Supreme Court), 339 (s. c., 48 N. Y. Suppl., 363, and 155 N. Y., 655). But we do not decide the question, for the reason stated, as it is sufficient to hold that, upon another ground, the intimation of the court was correct, and the nonsuit will not be set aside.