There was ample evidence to support tbe verdict of negligent delay in delivery of tbe message. This was not seriously questioned on tbe argument, tbe right of recovery being resisted chiefly on tbe ground tbat plaintiff, by making proper effort, could bave taken tbe train which left Raleigh on tbat day at 12 :50 (tbe schedule time seems to bave been at 12 :30), and would have arrived in Durham at or about 1:30, which would bave given plaintiff full time to bave been present at tbe funeral, and tbat, on tbe facts in evidence, no recovery for mental anguish should bave been allowed. It is undoubtedly tbe general rule, in these cases as in other actions of negligence, tbat in order to a valid recovery tbe negligence complained of should bave been tbe proximate cause of tbe injury, and they are subject, also, to another well recognized principle, tbat when a contract has been broken or tort committed it is incumbent upon tbe injured party to do what be can to reduce or lessen tbe damage, and tbat such damages as are reasonably incident to bis own default in this respect will ordinarily be considered too remote for recovery. Hocutt v. Telegraph Co., 147 N. C., p. 186; Bowen v. King, 146 N. C., p. 385; Tillinghast v. Cotton Mills, 143 N. C., p. 268; Rail *705 road v. Hardware Co., 143 N. C., p. 54; Kernodle v. Telegraph Co., 141 N. C., p. 436. But, considering the case in reference to both these positions, we are of opinion that defendant’s position cannot be sustained. ' Speaking to this question of her ability to get to the funeral notwithstanding the negligent delay, plaintiff testified, in part, that she lived at Johnson Street in the city of Raleigh, one-half to three-fourths of a mile from the Union Station; that her husband was a barber whose shop was somewhere near; that she received the message shortly before noon, and at that time she had no money, and could not obtain any till she saw her husband; that he was not in his shop at the time, but was downtown somewhere, and she could not see him until he came home at the dinner hour, which was usually 12 :30, and, further, that she had to make some purchases, a pair of shoes, before she could have gone; thát she had no time to have taken this train at 12:50, even if she had known of it, and that she did not go on fhe 4 p. m. train, as that would have been too late. She further testified that she was unable to pay $10, the price then required for an automobile to Durham. On this statement and other relevant testimony, we think his Honor made correct decision in referring the question to the jury to determine whether plaintiff, under all the 'facts as they existed, could by reasonable effort by train or automobile have gotten to Durham in time to have attended the funeral. Certainly there was nothing in the ruling that gave defendant any just ground for complaint. Smith v. Telegraph Co., 167 N. C., p. 248; Bailey v. Telegraph Co., 150 N. C., p. 316. It was further urged-for error that the court admitted testimony from the witness W. D. Pool to the effect that his wife, the deceased, wished the plaintiff to have their little boy in case she died. The entire statement on this point, questions and answers, are as follows:
Q. State whether or not you ever heard any expressions of affection between your wife and Mrs. Weeks? (Objection by defendant; objection overruled; defendant excepts. Exception No. 1.) A. Yes, they were — they thought lots of each other, and very often spoke of each other when they were away from each other. My wife wanted my sister to have my little boy if she died; if she died, if she was to die, she wanted my sister to have her little boy. (Objection by defendant to the foregoing answer; objection overruled; exception.)
The ruling of the court here might very well be upheld on the principle that when a part of the witness’s answer is relevant and competent, a general objection thereto will not be sustained, though a part of the answer may be improper. Ricks v. Woodard, 159 N. C., p. 647; Smathers v. Hotel Co., 167 N. C., p. 469; S. v. Ledford, 133 N. C., p. 714. But apart from this, where the state of feeling between two parties is a fact directly relevant to the issue, both the conduct of the parties *706toward each other and their conversations and declarations of one about the other are usually admissible, “the limitation being that they should be at a time and under circumstances to exclude any reasonable suspicion of their sincerity.” Luckey v. Telegraph Co., 151 N. C., pp. 551-553; S. v. Draughon, 151 N. C., pp. 667-670. In the present case the evidence was ample to show that these two relatives lived on terms of intimacy and affection with each other. On the record, it could not be seriously controverted. In the answer of the husband, containing the alleged objectionable utterances, he says: “They thought lots of each other”; and even if the declarations of Mrs. Pool, the deceased, not in the presence of plaintiff, was inadmissible as direct evidence, it could well be received in corroboration, and very certainly should not be held for reversible error.
We find no error in the proceedings and, on the record, the judgment in plaintiff’s favor must be affirmed..
No error.