If there was nothing in the record except that summons issued against and was served upon J. L. Davenport, agent for the Daniels Roanoke River Line Steamboat Company, we would not hesitate to set aside the judgment rendered against the company upon the ground of want of jurisdiction of the party — the corporation (Mauney v. The High Shoals Manufacturing Co., 39 N. C., 196; Young v. Barden, 90 N. C., 424); but it also appears that the company was entered on the record as a party and that it filed a plea denying liability, and it nowhere appears that this was not done before the attempt to enter a special appearance for the purpose of the motion to dismiss because no process had been served. The filing of the plea denying liability was an appearance by the corporation, and, if made before the motion to dis*298miss, gave to tbe court as full jurisdictiou of .tbe party as if a summons bad been regularly issued and served (Wheeler v. Cobb, 75 N. C., 25; Scott v. Life Assn., 137 N. C., 515; Rackley v. Roberts, 147 N. C., 207), and as every intendment and presumption is in favor of tbe validity of tbe judgment and tbe jurisdiction of the court, it must be assumed tbat tbe plea was entered and after tbat time tbe motion to dismiss made. Mauney v. Gidney, 88 N. C., 204; Settle v. Settle, 141 N. C., 573; Spillman v. Williams, 91 N. C., 487.
There is nothing in the record to rebut this presumption in favor of the' judgment, and tbe form of tbe motion to dismiss strongly corroborates it, because it is made upon the, ground tbat no summons has ever been issued or served, and not upon tbe ground tbat there has been no appearance.
We are therefore of opinion tbat tbe motion to dismiss was properly overruled, and as there is no other exception relied on, tbe judgment is affirmed.