In tbe construction of ordinances and statutes effect must be given, if possible, to every word and phrase (38 Cyc., 1128) ; it must be assumed tbat tbe lawmaking power intended to remedy an evil, and not to restrict unnecessarily tbe use of property or tbe engaging in any lawful business; and statutes and ordinances restricting tbe use of prop*102erty are strictly construed, and an intent to impose burdens on tbe citizens further than the general welfare demands will never be presumed. Nance v. R. R., 149 N. C., 375.
“All statutory restrictions of the use of property are imposed upon the theory that they are necessary for the safety, health, or comfort of the public; but a limitation which is unnecessary and unreasonable cannot be enforced.” S. v. Whitlock, 149 N. C., 543.
Applying- these principles to the ordinance before us, we are of opinion that his Honor was in error in holding that the defendants are guilty if they kept guano in Henderson within 400 feet of a dwelling or business house, although it annoyed no citizen and was not detrimental to health, and that the words “to annoyance of any citizen or the detriment of the public.health” have no application in this case.
The language quoted is not ambiguous, and it must be presumed that it was intended for- it to have some legal effect.
If referred to the clause immediately preceding, “or anything else that may be adjudged a nuisance,” it is meaningless, because anything sufficiently harmful to be adjudged a nuisance necessarily implies that it is an annoyance to at least one citizen or is injurious to health; and if it should be held that it does not refer to hides, 'guano, and bones, an arbitrary restriction is imposed upon the use and ownership of a well recognized and.useful article of trade and commerce.
This construction would convict the aldermen of Henderson of enacting an ordinance regulating the use of property when unnecessary to promote the coinfort or health of the citizens and of placing a burden upon its use and ownership, a conclusion which would render the ordinance invalid, and which ought not to be adopted unless the language imperatively demands it.
It seems to us that the natural and reasonable construction is that the sentence, “to the annoyance of any citizen or the detriment of public health,” qualifies the verb “keep,” and that it is the keeping to the annoyance of the citizens, etc., of hides, bones,, and guano, or anything else that may be adjudged a nuisance that is condemned.
The validity of that part of the ordinance referring to anything else that may be adjudged a nuisance is not before us.
A new trial is ordered for the error pointed out.
_ New trial.