It is the accepted rule of construction in this and other ■ written contracts that the intent of the parties as embodied in the entire instrument should prevail and that each and every part shall be given effect if it can be done by fair and reasonable intendment, and that in *289ascertaining this intent resort should be bad, primarily, to the language they have employed, and where this language expresses plainly, clearly, and distinctly the meaning of the parties, it must be given effect by the courts, .and other means of interpretation are not permissible. McCallum v. McCallum, post, 310; Kearney v. Vann, 154 N. C., 311; Hendricks v. Furniture Co., 156 N. C., 569; Bridgers v. Ormond, 153 N. C., 114; Davis v. Frazier, 150 N. C., 447; Walker v. Venters, 148 N. C., 388.
Applying the principle, we think it clear that the ten-year limitation, stated in the first portion of the contract, is descriptive as to the§ size of the timber conveyed and specifying the time within which the measurement must be had: “of the dimensions of 10 inches or more in diameter at a distance of 12 inches from the ground, or which shall attain such size within the period of ten years from the date of the instrument.” And the twenty-year limitation, in the latter portion, by correct interpretation, is as clearly designed and intended to fix the time within which the timber sold must be cut and removed. True, the instrument here only uses the word “remove,” but, considering the extent and purposes of the contract, the term, by clear intendment, includes the right to cut during said period by the usual and ordinary methods of lumbermen in that vicinity. It is the only interpretation which would allow to the term as used any reasonable significance, and is the construction approved with us in well considered cases on the subject. Lumber Co. v. Smith, 150 N. C., 253, followed in Bateman v. Lumber Co., 154 N. C., 248, and other eases. This being the correct and clearly expressed import of the contract, his Honor was right in declining to hear testimony as to what would be a reasonable time within which to cut the timber. This question of reasonable time only arises when, as in Hawkins’ case, the time to commence is left indefinite, “fifteen years from the time he commenced cutting,” and it was held that the grantee was thereby required to commence within a reasonable time. But in the contract before us the term refers to the date of the instrument (Hornthal v. Howcott, 154 N. C., 228; Warren v. Short, 119 N. C., 39), and this being definite and certain, the evidence tending to establish a reasonable time was incompetent and properly excluded. And the court also made correct- ruling as to the evidence offered to show that the parties to the agreement only intended to allow ten years in which to cut and remove the timber. This would be to contradict the written agreement of the parties by parol evidence, and is clearly contrary to authority. Speaking to such evidence, in Walker v. Venters, the Chief Justice said: “Such evidence is never admitted if the wording of the written contract is clear or if the evidence offered is in direct contradiction of the intrinsic meaning of the language of the contract.”
*290While we approve his Honor’s construction of the deed and uphold his rulings excluding evidence tending to alter or contradict the same by parol, we must hold that, as we understand the record, the appeal has been prematurely taken. Unless otherwise provided by statute, an appeal only lies from a final judgment or one in its nature final, and, under our decisions, a nonsuit may not be taken to test an adverse ruling of a judge, leaving issuable matter presented and undetermined in the court below. In deference to the suggestion of his Honor that an authoritative construction of this deed is desirable, we have passed upon the questions presented, a course that is pursued in rare instances (Milling Co. v. Finley, 110 N. C., 411, and 110 N. C., 503), but, under our decisions we must hold, as stated, that the appeal is premature and adjudge that the same be dismissed. Merrick v. Bedford, 141 N. C., 505; Hoss v. Palmer, 150 N. C., 18.