The plaintiff testified: “That he entered into a contract with the defendant, for which he was to be paid $10,000 for the construction of a bridge; that John W. Hays of Pitts-burg was the chief engineer for the Camden Ferry Company, who made the plans and specifications submitted to contractors upon which to base bids for work, and that Hayg finally received and accepted the work; that Hays had his representative, Mr. Greenleaf, directly in charge and supervision of the work, and Hays himself came occasionally and was present when the bridge was finally accepted. The specifications upon which the bid was made contained the approximate length of each pile in the bridge, and when the work was done the total length of the overrun was 28.4 per cent in excess of the specifications.”
The substance of the plaintiff’s claim (over and above the sum admitted to be due) is for longer piling than those called for in the defendant’s engineer’s specifications.
*565Tbe plaintiff further testified that “A .reasonable value for tbe excess of material used was $606.17, and a reasonable value of additional material and work aggregates a total of $1,125.60, amounting to an excess of 28.4 per cent in lineal feet over tbe specifications contained in tbe plans prepared by tbe engineer for tbe company as tbe basis of bids for tbe work.”
Tbe contract and specifications contained tbis clause: “The length and number of pile estimated as follows, which is understood to be an approximation as nearly as may be forecasted from the plans, profiles, and inspection of soil, but is not a definite term in this contract
Tbe plaintiff offered to prove that in bridge construction tbe word “approximation” bas a technical meaning understood and accepted by civil engineers and contractors in tbe preparation of contracts and specifications.
Tbe plaintiff qualified as an expert bridge builder and offered to testify that in all specifications for bridge building an approximate length of a pile would mean that it ought to be within 3 to 5 per cent of tbe absolute or true length. It is insisted that tbis question should have been submitted to tbe jury to determine whether or not 28.4 per cent excess in lineal feet over tbe amount called for in tbe plans and contract would be approximately tbe same as those called for in tbe plans and contract.
We are of opinion bis Honor erred in excluding tbis evidence.
It is well settled that where words or expressions are used in a written contract, which have in particular trades or vocations a known technical meaning, parol evidence is competent to inform tbe court and jury as to tbe exact meaning of such expression in that particular trade or vocation, and it is for tbe jury to bear tbe evidence and give effect to such expressions as they may find their meaning to be. Moore v. Eason, 33 N. C., 569; Blalock v. Clark, 137 N. C., 142; Ward v. Gay, 137 N. C., 399; Hutton v. Warren, 1 M. and W., 466; Sargent v. Adams, 63 Am. Dec., 718.
While tbe construction of a written contract is ordinarily a matter for tbe court,' yet where tb'e language used is doubtful in *566the sense that it requires the exposition of experts or explanations by evidence of the usage of trade or other extraneous circumstances, such testimony is admissible and should, under appropriate instructions, be submitted to the jury. Simpson v. Pegram, 112 N. C., 544; 1 Greenleaf Ev., 280; Page on Contracts, vol. 2, see. 1107; McIntosh on Contracts, pp. 492-502.
When words are ambiguous and uncertain in their meaning, they should be given that meaning which all the facts and surrounding circumstances show that the parties intended them to have. R. R. v. R. R., 147 N. C., 368.
We understood it to be admitted that the necessity for the extra long piling was- not disputed, and there is abundant evidence to prove that they were furnished with the knowledge and consent of the defendant’s engineer.
It follows, therefore, that if the jury should find by a preponderance of the evidence that the word “approximation,” when used in such contracts, has the well understood meaning ascribed to it by the plaintiff, he would be entitled to recover for the extra expense and labor incident to furnishing the extra long piling.
New trial.