It is not necessary to decide whether any evidence of notice, outside of a survey, is admissible to aid a vague and indefinite entry, as his Honor heard the evidence tending to prove notice, and the jury has found under proper instructions there was no notice.
The entry of the plaintiff is in all material respects like the one considered in Call v. Robinett, 147 N. C., 616, which was held too vague to affect a senior grantee with, notice, and that case is decisive of this.
In the present case the entry is “E. Wallace enters 100 acres of land in said county in Boomer Township, on the waters of White’s Creek, adjoining the lands of Robert Barlow and others, beginning on a stake in Robert Barlow’s line on Berry’s Mountain and running various courses for complements,” and in the Call-Robinett case, “640 acres of land in said county, lying on the waters of Stony Fork, in Elk Township, adjoining the lands of S. G. Anderson and others, beginning on a stake in S. G. Anderson’s line and running various courses for complements”; and of the latter entry the Court said:
“The defendant says, conceding that the legal title passed to plaintiff by entry, survey, and grant, he is entitled -to have him declared a trustee for his benefit. It is well settled that when an entry is made, and subsequent thereto another person lays an entry and takes a grant, he acquires the title, and the grantee *678will be declared a- trustee for tbe first enterer; tlie reason of tbis being that tbe first entry entitled tbe enterer to a prior right or equity to call for legal title upon complying witb tbe statute, and tbe second enterer took, subject to tbis claim or equity, tbe entry being notice thereof. Tbe defendant is confronted witb two difficulties in tbis aspect of tbe case: First, bis entry is subsequent to that under which plaintiff claims. * Second, bis entry is too vague and indefinite to give any notice. It is always held that to entitle tbe first to have tbe grantee declared a trustee, bis entry must be sufficiently definite to put tbe second enterer upon notice. In Johnson v. Shelton, 39 N. C., 85, Ruffin, 0. J., says that if the,-first entry is too vague to put tbe second enterer upon notice, equity will not aid him. Tbis is a different question from that which we first discussed. There tbe survey makes tbe vague entry certain, and tbe State accepts it and issues tbe grant. Here tbe question of notice of tbe first entry controls tbe rights of tbe parties. If tbe first enterer makes bis entry certain by survey before tbe second entry, it is sufficient. So, in Munroe v. McCormick, 41 N. C., 85, Pearson, J., says: ‘When one makes an entry so vague as not to identify tbe land, such entry does not amount to notice and does not give any priority’of right as against another individual who makes an entry, has it surveyed, and takes out a grant.’ Tested by tbe decided cases cited in Grayson v. English and Fisher v. Owens, swpra, we think defendant’s entry too vague to afford notice. It is a 'floating entry,’ without any definite beginning. ‘A stake in S. G-. Anderson’s line’ is about as vague as it is possible to make it. It calls for no single point from which a survey could be made, and gives no other indicia for that purpose.”
Tbe exception to tbe exclusion of tbe two questions asked tbe witness Ferguson are without merit. There is nothing in tbe record to indicate what answers would have been made by tbe witness, and tbe questions relate to an entry not involved in tbis controversy, and which, as tbe witness says, tbe plaintiff “let run out.”
Tbe other exceptions are untenable in view of our holding as to tbe sufficiency of tbe plaintiff’s entry.
No error.