after stating the case: The authorities fully support the charge of his Honor: Brown v. Ray, 32 N. C., 13; Faust v. Faust, 144 N. C., 386; Kirkman v. Hodgin, 151 N. C., 591. In the first of these cases Pearson, G. J., said: “To make a Consideration it is not necessary that the person making the promise should receive or expect to receive any benefit. It is sufficient if the other party be subjected to loss or inconvenience. A trust or confidence reposed, by reason of an undertaking to do an act, is held to be a sufficient consideration to support an action on the promise”; and this was approved in the last case cited.
In 9 Cyc., 312, the author cites many authorities to support the position that “There is a consideration if the promisee, in return for the promise, does anything legal which he is not bound to do, or refrains from doing anything which he has the right to do, whether there is any actual loss or detriment to him, or actual benefit to the promisor or not.”
In Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y., 538 (21 A. S. R., 693), the Court applied this principle to a contract to refrain from the use of tobacco and intoxicating liquors, and said:
“The defendant contends that the contract was without consideration to support it, and therefore invalid. He asserts that the promisee, by refraining from the use of liquor and tobacco, was not harmed, but benefited; that that which he did was best for him to do, independently of his uncle’s promise, and insists that it follows that, unless the promisor was benefited, the contract was without consideration; a contention which, if well founded, would seem to leave open for controversy in many *651cases whether that which the promisee did or omitted to do was in fact of such benefit to him as to leave no consideration to support the enforcement of the promisor’s agreement. Such a rule could not be tolerated, and is without foundation in law. The Exchequer Chamber, in 1815, defined consideration as follows: ‘A valuable consideration in the sense of the law may consist either in some right, interest, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the other. Courts ‘will not ask whether the thing which forms the consideration does in fact benefit the promisee or a third party, or is of any substantial value to any one. If is enough that something is -promised, done, forborne, or suffered by the party to whom the promise is made, as consideration for the promise made to him.’ Anson on Contracts, 63. -‘In general, a waiver of any legal right at the request of another party is a sufficient consideration for a promise.’ Parsons on Contracts, 444. ‘Any damage, or suspension, or forbearance of a right will be sufficient to sustain a promise.’ 2 Kent’s Com. (12 Ed.), 465.
“Pollock, in his work on contracts, page 166, after citing the. definition given by the Exchequer Chamber already quoted, says: ‘The second branch of this judicial description is really the most important one. Consideration means, not so much that one party is profiting, as that the other abandons some legal right in the present or limits his legal freedom of action in the future, as an inducement for the promise of the first.’ ” Hamer v. Sidway, 21 Am. St. Rep. (N. Y.), 693.
Applying these principles, there can be no doubt that there was evidence of a consideration sufficient to support the promise of the defendant, as the plaintiff testified that he refused to sell his stock in the furniture company except upon condition that the defendant executed the paper declared on in the complaint.
The exceptions to the evidence do not require extended discussion. The first six exceptions are to the refusal of the court to permit the defendant to prove that the furniture factory and another lot sold by the plaintiff King to the defendant were worth less than was paid for them.
*652Tbe evidence offered was remote, being largely tbe selling price at a bankruptcy sale some time after tbe purchase of tbe property; but conceding tbat it would furnish some evidence of value, it was not relevant to any issue involved in this controversy.
Tbe fact tbat King was benefited by tbe sale of bis stock, if shown to be true, would not destroy tbe consideration for tbe promise of tbe defendant, because tbe consideration consists in yielding tbe legal right to retain tbe stock, and to impose tbe conditions ujion which be would sell.
Nor would tbe evidence excluded justify tbe inference tbat tbe plaintiff placed such exorbitant prices upon property owned 'by him, which was needed for tbe school, as made it impossible for tbe defendant to establish tbe school, if this defense is pleaded by tbe defendant; but tbe special plea of tbe defendant is not tbat be could not perform on account of tbe conduct of tbe plaintiff, but tbat be was not required to pay if be used bis best efforts to establish tbe school.
Opinions, honestly entertained, are too diverse as to tbe wisdom and propriety of tbe establishment of schools in particular localities for us to bold tbat tbe failure to vote for such schools is impeaching, which is. tbe subj’ect of tbe seventh exception.
Tbe letter written by tbe plaintiff to tbe defendant, suggesting tbat be see tbe sheriff before bis nomination, about tbe deposit of county funds in tbe Bank of Spray, would not necessarily be impeaching; but if it would have this effect, tbe defendant could not impeach tbe witness by proof of particular acts.
~We have examined tbe remaining exceptions and find no error.
It appears to us from the record tbat tbe defendant has not been seeking profit or advantage for himself, and tbat be has been actuated by high public motives; but there is evidence to support tbe verdict, and we cannot disturb it.