PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL.
The motion to set aside the judgment rendered at September Term, 1913, is made by the intervenors, who were permitted to interplead for the purpose of asserting their title to the property attached, and1 not by any one purporting to represent the defendant corporation, and the ground upon which the motion rests is not any defect or irregularity connected with the interpleaders, but that process has not been served on the original defendant.
Intervenors, who claim property attached, raise but one issue between them and the plaintiffs, and that is, whether they are the owners of the property (Bank v. Furniture Co., 120 N. C., 417; Manufacturing Co. v. Tierney, 133 N. C., 638), and they are not permitted to attack the regularity of the attachment proceedings (Blair v. Puryear, 87 N. C., 102; Cook v. Mining Co., 114 N. C., 618), nor can they deny the sufficiency and validity of the seizure of the goods and levy of the attachment, when the property is delivered to them upon the execution of a bond. Pearre v. Folb, 123 N. C., 243.
In Bank v. Furniture Co., supra, the intervenors excepted because evidence was rejected to prove that the attachment had never been levied on the property, and the Court, passing on the exception, says: “Intervenors in attachment proceedings are not allowed to make any such issue; it is none of their business. If the property is theirs, they recover it whether the attachment is levied or not; and if the property is not theirs, it makes no difference to them whether it is levied or not. The intervenors *407can have but one issue, viz., Noes the property attached belong to them?” .And in Cotton Mills v. Weil, 129 N. C., 455, the in-tervenors having excepted to the refusal to give them a separate trial: “The intervenors’ exceptions cannot be sustained, because it was interested in one issue only, ‘Was the cotton attached by plaintiff its property when attached?’ and that issue was submitted.” And in Dawson v. Thigpen, 137 N. C., 468: “It is well settled that in an action involving the title to property an interpleader is restricted to the issue as to his title or claim to the property, and cannot raise or litigate questions or rights which do not affect such titles. McLean v. Douglass, 28 N. C., 233. He does not, speaking with accuracy, become a party to the action in the same sense and with the same'status as the original parties, or those made so pending the action either by the court ex mero motu or upon application.”
If, then, the intervenors are only interested in the fifth issue, there is no reason for setting aside that issue because of defect of service upon the original defendant, who is interested in the other issues, and they do not purport to represent the corporation, and cannot, therefore, move in its behalf.
So far as the record discloses, the intervenors are not injured by the judgment, as by their intervention they are in possession of property of the value of $1,500, and can satisfy the judgment against them by the payment of $600 and costs.
We are not inadvertent to the statement in the record that the intervenors were denied the right upon the trial to introduce evidence as to the amount of the .damages, but as they were not interested in that issue, they had no such right.
There is a suggestion in the record that there was but one company, known as the Piedmont Lumber Company, and that the real controversy was whether it was a corporation or a partnership. If the intervenors wished to raise this issue, and to be heard upon the merits of the action, they ought to have asked-to be made parties defendant, and as they have not done so, and have chosen the ground upon which to make the fight, they ought to abide the result.
There is error.
Reversed.
*408APPEAL OF INTERVENORS.
As stated in the brief of the intervenors, the principal question involved in this appeal is, whether there was any evidence contradicting Bur rus, who testified that he and Carter were the owners of the property attached, and this question was made to depend, on the trial, on whether there was any evidence that the Piedmont Lumber Company was a corporation, and in our opinion there was evidence of the corporate existence as against the intervenors.
The admission of Burrus to the plaintiffs, that the Piedmont Lumber Company was a chartered company, the circumstance that deeds to land were taken in the name of the company, instead <pf in the names of individuals as partners, and .the testimony of Burrus that, “at the time that this property was attached in this action, the Piedmont Lumber Company, corporation, didn’t have any interest in the world in the property,” furnish some evidence’ of the fact.
The witness Burrus was asked on cross-examination if he did not tell the plaintiff that the Piedmont Lumber Company was "a chartered corporation, to which he answered: “I did not. It never was a chartered corporation.”
Plaintiffs moved to- strike out so' much of the answer of the witness to the question as stated that the Piedmont Lumber Company was never a chartered corporation.
The court thereupon overruled the objection, and motion of the plaintiffs so far as the evidence may tend to show that R. S. Burrus and James T. Carter, trading under the name of the Piedmont Lumber Company, were not incorporated, and sustained the objection and motion so far as the evidence may tend to show the nonincorporation of any other company, and the in-tervenors excepted.
This seems to have given the intervenors the full benefit of the evidence; but if the ruling was erroneous, it was cured, as the witness afterwards testified, without objection, that they never took out a charter.
*409There is nothing in the record to show the relevancy of the Yow deed, and if offered as declarations of the grantors, it was inadmissible, because in their favor.
The intervenors have no interest in the first, second, and third issues, which were necessary to determine-the controversy between the original, parties. The case was not tried at the return term, as in Brown v. Bheinhart, 112 N. C., 417.
"We have considered the exceptions discussed in the brief of appellant, although the- appeal could be dismissed because the judgment appealed from had been set aside, and we find no error.
It is possible the award of damages ($600) is larger than it would have been if the intervenors had been made parties defendant, and had contested the issue, but the condition of-the record does'not permit us to inquire into this.
No error.