We have given due consideration to tbe zealous and learned argument of counsel for defendant in behalf of bis client, but we find no error in tbe record.
Tbe first objection to tbe indictment, that tbe word “fraudulently” is not used in connection with tbe words “designedly, falsely, and feloniously,” is met by tbe statute (Eevisal, sec. 3432), which says: “That it shall be sufficient in any indictment for obtaining or attempting to obtain any such property by false pretenses to allege that tbe party accused did tbe act with intent to defraud, without alleging an intent to defraud any particular person, and without alleging any ownership of tbe chattel, money, or valuable security; and on tbe trial of any such indictment it shall not be necessary to prove an intent to defraud any particular person, but it shall be sufficient to prove that tbe party accused did the.act charged with an intent to defraud.”
Tbe intent to defraud is alleged, and with more particularity than is required.
It is true, as contended by tbe defendant, that tbe indictment must show a causal connection between tbe false representation and tbe parting with tbe property (S. v. Whedbee, 152 N. C., 774), but “no particular form of words is necessary; an allegation that £by means of tbe false pretense’ or 'relying on tbe false pretense,’ or tbe like, is sufficient, where it is apparent that tbe delivery of tbe property was tbe natural result of tbe pretense alleged.” 19 Cyc., 430.
*526The indictment alleges that the defendant falsely represented to- Frederick Rutledge that the construction of a certain house cost $6,500, and, in one place, that by means of the representation he obtained from the said Rutledge, and in another from said Rutledge and B. H. Rutledge, $5,500 in money, which, in our opinion, satisfies the law.
The indictment also contains all of the elements of a false pretense. It charges that a representation was made as to a subsisting fact (tlm cost of the construction of the house) ; that the representation was false; that it was made knowingly and designedly and with intent to defraud; and that by means of the representation he obtained $5,500 in money.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the motions to quash and in arrest of judgment were properly overruled.
The defendant was not entitled to have his prayers for special instructions considered under the findings of his Honor that they were handed up on the second day of the trial, after two speeches had been made on the preceding day, and when the judge was preparing his charge and had no time to consider them.
We said at the last term, in Holder v. Lumber Co., 161 N. C., 178: “After the argument commences it is well settled that counsel will not be permitted to file requests for special instructions without leave of the court, and no such leave appears to have been given in this case, for the court declined to consider the prayers after they were handed up.”
The fact that there is a representation in writing does not prevent the introduction of evidence of a parol representation, and the letter of Frederick Rutledge to B. H. Rutledge was competent for the purpose for which it was admitted, to corroborate Frederick Rutledge, who was a witness.
The admission of evidence as to what the house was worth, if erroneous, was cured in the charge, in which the jury were carefully instructed that they could not consider any representation except the one as to the cost of construction.
Nor' do wé find any valid objection to the charge, which'is remarkably clear, full, and accurate. If it is the subject of criticism at all, it is because it was too favorable to the defendant.