after stating the case: It is well recognized that marriage is to be regarded and dealt with as a valuable consideration. Garvin v. Cromartie, 33 N. C., 174; Page on Contracts, see. 299; 1 Bishop on the Law of Married Women, sec. 775. In this last citation the author quotes from Johnston v. Dilliard, 1st Bay (S. Ca.), in which marriage was said to be “the highest consideration known in law,” and in the case it was further said to be “a consideration good against creditors, unless done with fraudulent -intent.” And also from my Lord Golee as follows: “If a man had given land to a man with his daughter in frank marriage, generally a fee simple would pass without the word heirs,’ for there-is no consideration so much respected in law as the consideration of marriage in respect of alliance and posterity.”
2. The instrument contains an agreement on such a consideration to convey a tract of land sufficiently described.
3. The written agreement, though executed long after the contract between the parties, which had been made by parol, is a sufficient memorandum to meet the provisions of our statute of frauds requiring contracts concerning land to be in writing. Magee v. Blankenship, 95 N. C., 563; 29 A. and E., p. 854.
*32Oil the verdict, therefore, and under our decisions, the record presents a case calling for a decree for specific performance, the judgment entered in the cause. Combe v. Adams, 150 N. C., 64; Whitted v. Fuquay, 127 N. C., 68; Price v. Price, 133 N. C., 494; Boles v. Caudle, 133 N. C., 528.
It was chiefly objected for defendant that this relief was not open to plaintiff by reason of the stipulation also appearing in the instrument that plaintiff, the obligee, should be good and kind to the daughter. The position being that this stipulation rendered the agreement too indefinite and uncertain to permit the remedy sought in .this case and in any court; second, that the same should be construed as a condition precedent covering the entire period of the married life of the parties.
We would be most reluctant to adopt either of these views, tending as they do in the one case to invalidate the instrument and in the other to defeat its evident and controlling purpose; and having due regard to the language of this stipulation, the relationship and evident purpose of the obligor, to provide for the support and kind treatment of his daughter in her married life, and the attendant circumstances of the transaction, all of them proper to be considered in arriving at the intent of the parties as expressed in the entire instrument (R. R. v. R. R., 147 N. C., pp. 368-382; Merriam v. U. S., 107 U. S., 441), we are of opinion that the learned judge who tried the cause has given the correct construction to the agreement in holding this feature of'it to be a condition subsequent, and as such directing that the same be incorporated in the deed to be made by defendant. Such an interpretation sufficiently satisfies the language of the provision, will best effectuate the purpose of the parties, and is in accord with our decisions more directly relevant to the question presented. Helms v. Helms, 137 N. C., 206.
We find no reversible error in the record, and the judgment as entered is affirmed.